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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STAT* i "h UTAH : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case I\k ''MV.u;! CA 
vs. : 
KENNETH N^LAN nHREWSBUPV, " : ' Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant, : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an dipped] I i. urn i orn' i ef i onr. for failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop, a third degree felony, in violation 
ol Ui ah, hode Ann S 41-6-13.5 (Supp. 1994) unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance with intent t.n d.i stribul. <-.', a t.h.. i I 
degree felony,, in violation of Utah Code Ann, S8 - A"I - 6 {1) (a) (IV) 
(Supp, 1 yy4) and giving false i dent 11.
 r \- u ,, peace officer a 
Class C misdemeanor", in violation of Utah Code Ann "' *•; b-ljii' 
(> - u<±) xi * *:<-- I- -. - Judicio r istrict Cour >^>t :
 3 
Count v , State r : . an 
presiding. This Court, has jarisdic:.' *• : .. i~ :_i .-ceeding as 
I i , 'V i 'JH'1 by IM. ah r/ode Ann, f f • — - - -
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court: properly refuse - i: dire " he 
jury wi t l"i efel endanii " s i equesi eh quest • irrelevant 
and sought t- nullify the court's instruct .„•: . :. ,,ow ^ ^ , -.^ ? 
wTl>-' IP*--- - j.s within the discretion ^e : «_ 
judge,, as lony as counsel is given adequate inf
 a .,. 
which to evaluate prospective jurors.'' State v. Sherard, 818 
P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App. 1991). "For a court's exercise of 
discretion in disallowing voir dire questions to be overturned, 
appellant must show that the abuse of discretion rose to the 
level of reversible error." State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 
(Utah App. 1990) (citing State v. Pascoe, 774 P.2d 512, 514 (Utah 
1989)) . 
2. Did the trial court properly admit the marijuana 
evidence, challenged for failure to show a chain of custody? 
Utah courts have historically and uniformly applied an abuse of 
discretion standard in reviewing trial court rulings on chain of 
custody. £&£ State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 
670, 672 (1972); State v. Wynia. 754 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah App. 
1988). Even under more recent caselaw, holding the admission of 
evidence is ultimately a question of law reviewed for 
correctness, State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 781 n.3 (Utah 1991), 
where the issue concerns authentication, the court's ruling 
should be given deference based on the trial court's privileged 
position in viewing physical evidence and weighing conflicting 
testimony of witnesses. £££. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 938-39 
(Utah 1994) (identifying trial court's opportunity to observe 
"facts," such as a witness's demeanor, as a circumstance 
entitling its ruling be given some degree of deference). 
2 
-z cr *: 311 -z 
CONSTITPTIONAIi PROVISIONS r STATWES AND RTOES 
The following const,;... .. n^l pr * — 
relevant in the determinate o* * * :.<- issues 
attached a! A J i^-T*< liiiii ->: 
Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure 18; 
Utah Rul>- of Evidence 901 
ST&TPffiNT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with failure to respond to an 
of t iceir"" M1 s,igiul f« sti-p, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Ut a h Code Ann . § 4 1 - 6 • 1 •*> 5 (Supp . 19 94 j ( O ;• u n T , i m l a w \ 11 I 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to distrit .\e a 
third degree teion) , JI MO'iat .iui >1 I.M -,ih '"'" ."".iiu Aim 
§ 58-3 7-8(1) (a) iiv) (Supp, 19 94) (Count: lii, assault on a peace 
of/fi1, er, i ,"1'! .:IIFC" A misdemeanui, i" * *^ - -* r*^- -~^ e Arm. 
§ 7 6 • 5 - 1 0 2 4 ( S it p p , 19 y 4 ) (Coun t 
to a peace officer, a Class •' -: isdemeano: 
Code Ann, £ "" ll '• i bupp. 
to represent himse.i was granted c*:^  standi 
appointed < '- .-- '» . Fol? ^ - -i *-* ' • 
convicted on Counts 
assai t charge .5; =-
': \* -.• u ulicit 
a: , „:n of Utah 
D e f e n d a n t ' s mot ion 
. - n - e l w a ^ 
- ' 'i *-* --• defendant was 
i n , 
Defendant was s e n t e n c e d t o t h i r t y Six 
. i o i - o 4 ) . 
3 
STATEMSNT OF THE FACTS 
At about 9:00 a.m. on December 31, 1994, Officer Martin 
Turner of the Utah Highway Patrol, while patrolling in the area 
of 4700 West and 2100 South, saw defendant operating a car with a 
broken windshield and a missing lefthand mirror (R. 252-54) . 
Officer Turner moved behind the car and activated his overhead 
lights. When the car stopped, Officer Turner approached the car 
and asked defendant for his driver's license and registration (R. 
254-55) . Defendant was unable to produce either document. At 
that point Officer Turner asked defendant to step out of the car 
and asked defendant for his name, date of birth and address. 
Defendant gave the officer a date of birth, said he did not know 
his exact address and indicated his name was "Donald Shrewsbury" 
(R. 255). After allowing defendant to return to the car, Officer 
Turner asked the female passenger for identification and the name 
of the driver. She also indicated that defendant's name was 
"Donald Shrewsbury" (R. 256). Officer Turner returned to his 
patrol car to verify that the driver was Donald Shrewsbury. 
After receiving information from dispatch, Officer Turner again 
asked defendant to step out of the car. In response, defendant 
drove away (R. 257). 
Officer Turner returned to his patrol car, activated his 
overhead lights and siren and pursued defendant. (R. 259-60). 
Defendant fled east on 2100 South, entered Bangerter Highway via 
an off-ramp, and continued south with Officer Turner in pursuit 
4 
" it'll cm I I lights-"! on and siren going (R, 260), At 3100 South and 
at the 3500 South highway ol t -Lamp del endant went I hrough red 
lights without stopping, traveling between eighty-five and ninety 
mi Lfc-.h |.H-.'J IIMUI i -I --in i i t'«'i' skid and swerve to avoid a 
collision (R. 280-62), At 3L>00 South deteudaij"1 I u iiit-d e.is! i,g-jj 
reaching speeds between eighty-five and ninety miles per hour (R 
264i At. aDoui ^ n u we,;1!, defendant, hi akedi rapidly and made a hard 
right t, urn into an aoartment complex parking lot, drove to I; he 
2 t\i" ii.d rtP'f > » *•* "r,inst a retaining wall (R, 265-66), 
Defendant immediately -; nuf ul tin L»JUI -mini .Iniliil iiuntnni, 
eluding Officer Turner IK. 261 , /nnn , 
Otticei IUIIII m j-iilii! I ! In W< \ \ V i"I 1 , Police Department 
overheard Officer Turner's radio bioadcastb and jcined the di 
ci'ias'f HI ^c fin ntiuth IR >97-9Hi When defendant's car entered 
the west entrance of th» Aspen N I L idqt Mpdi i I W M H ,• iMfiiei wiiqht 
proceeded to the east entrance tn intercept defendant (K, 3 m l , 
Howe1 nj i , ieteni-iii* lid 1 " ,' n- l • ' < Jra i « " 1 where he jumped 
the from, car, pursued by Officer Turner (R 3 03 ) , 
Defendant initially eluded the police officers iR, 2 6n, "fi 02-
P ^  - ...owever, a i ter a b i: iei <„. 11d»*• i i 1111 11 <"3e i: e n d a n t p \ i s h» • 11 
Officer Wright; ,in an attempt to escape, Officer Wright and 
c-jinifif net poi ire-"' m fi rer tackled defendant and arrested him IR, 
3 04-07) . 
Officer Turner then searched defendant's fanny pack and 
found a Utah i denL i f i ca t ion ea i d , i den! i f\ i nq defendant a; i 
5 
"Kenneth Shrewsbury." He additionally found three baggies of a 
green leafy substance that field tested positively for marijuana, 
cigarette rolling papers, a silver set of weighing scales and two 
hundred seventy-two dollars ($272.00) (R. 270-72, 274, 279, 281). 
Jennifer Angus, criminalist with the Utah State Crime Laboratory 
testified that the green leafy substance was marijuana, weighing 
71.4 grams (R. 315-316). Officer Wright testified that in his 
opinion, the amount of marijuana, its distribution into baggies 
and the presence of the scales indicated that the marijuana was 
for distribution (R. 3 08-09). Officer Turner confirmed that 
opinion (R. 289). 
Defendant admitted, both when arrested and at trial, that 
the substance seized from his fanny pack was marijuana, to which 
he had a right based on his "free agency" (R. 282, 363). He also 
admitted that he was unemployed at the time the $272.00 was 
seized from him (R. 343). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court properly refused defendant's requested voir 
dire questions because they were not intended to explore for 
bias, prejudice or general information but because they were 
irrelevant and calculated to identify prospective jurors who 
would misapply the law as instructed by the court. The trial 
court's voir dire was sufficient to elicit all the information 
necessary for defendant to assess the jury venire's attitude 
6 
towards his use of marijuana • ir cirul •»: 7 \ . the trial court 
elicited f i '.'in I '"^  W P I I > ; u s u " :^r.^ " -1 ly t o 
defendant ' s defense of free agency, the rep »r.'UL. ui detem . 
reqijPhfpd questions. 
FOltfl 1J 
An adequate chain of custody foi the admission of the 
n,diij .ill.- was * • -il linlic I The arrestinq officer distinctively 
labeled the property bau containing t iit« t.hi ee bayuieh 11 
mari-juana seized from defendant when hf< was arrested, ail of 
which he test J tie"1 > I" Mi'i » 'H- Srini*1 ii w'im MH.I wy& seized. 
The criminalist referenced the labeling which both tier notes and 
a poJ 11 e sel ziui" report torni connect with the police case number 
for this case Any gap created by tl>' tailuM- ill 1]dns{'Mi* inq 
and receiving officials to testify goes only T O the weight and 
not t he a dm J b, il i I it > I I I \< I-MI <i< in •( Vn t t* hermore , defendant j 
claim that the marijuana appeared different at trial than when 
,M i "(i I i1. Mihpr anuially vitiated by his admission that any change 
could have bet-i. natural and l1. 1 <"{•'I \v hi} I 'w . H i c e i s I 
the evidence appeared to be unchanged 
POINT I 
T H E TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
REQUESTED VOIR DIRE QUESTIONS WHICH WERE 
CALCULATED TO IDENTIFY JURORS SYMPATHETIC TO 
JURY NULLIFICATION 
Defendant argues that the tu idl cuui'i w n-" filial t i I i" I •• 
panel of veniremen three questions denied him the opportunity to 
7 
not only detect actual bias so that appropriate challenges for 
cause might have been made, but also to intelligently exercise 
his peremptory challenges. Appellant's Br. at 12-18. However, 
in the context of defendant's defense of free agency, it is plain 
that defendant sought, not to exercise the legitimate scope of 
voir dire, but rather to identify jurors that would be 
sympathetic to views contrary to the law. Further, the questions 
were inadequate to elicit information relevant to any particular 
juror's biases concerning the use of marijuana or resistance to 
law enforcement, concerns which the trial court's voir dire 
reasonably dispelled. 
A. The Standard of Review and Applicable Law 
11
 The extent of voir dire is within the discretion of the 
trial judge, as long as counsel is given adequate information 
with which to evaluate prospective jurors." State v. Sherard, 
818 P.2d 554, 558 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 843 P.2d 516 
(Utah 1992). u[W]hether the judge has abused that discretion is 
determined, not by considering isolated questions, but 
'considering the totality of the questioning.'" Doe v. Hafen, 
772 P.2d 456, 457-58 (Utah App. 1989) (citing State v> Bishop, 
753 P.2d 439, 448 (Utah 1988)), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
1990). "For a court's exercise of discretion in disallowing voir 
dire questions to be overturned, appellant must show that the 
abuse of discretion rose to the level of reversible error." 
State v. Hall, 797 P.2d 470, 472 (Utah App. 1990) (citing State 
8 
v . Paseoe 1)4 1" Ad 512, bi4 (ULali 198:J>JJ"I cert, denied. 8 04 P. 2d 
1232 (Utah 199. . 
The State recognizes that Lhe trial court must allow vcir 
due adequate perni 111 ml discovery of bias and prejudice and 
for the intelligent exercise ol peremptory "' hd J 1 eucjes S Lai t. v , 
Worthen. 76 5 P 2d 83 9, 84 5 (Utah 1988) (citing State v. Ball. b85 
P.2d lOB'b, J utii (Utah i MH i : id >w< 'Vfi i i i i i s t he impart i -i I 
jury, not complete voir dire questioning, LhdL is Lhe ultimo •• 
light M *o'\y »€nl AildartOil v • Montgomery,, filjv p 2d 828, 835 (Utah 
1980) ""[The supreme court] would liKt in i'iu| tk-Jb J *M» i he 
important role that jury voir dire has in ensuring that all 
litigants in a edse lec^jvi1 .-i I . it i i •IIMIM mp.rtrt.jal iury ,' State v . 
James 819 P. 2d 781, 7y> (Utah Jli91J (emphasis added) *• i i i n L 
court has Mil' r«l:i] i qat if"«n t o impanel ai) impartial jury, Resales-
Lopez v. United States, u I i i i » 
1634 '1981) . 
J v Nullificat ,un 
Afte: tr> J : . o, ^ , « . . n-rv voi i dire, 
defei idant asked the LI.LCI.L OvUi t to ask the venire the following 
questions: 
1, Do you believe that an individual may use 
marijuana? 
2. Do you believe there are times which mayf under 
certain circumstances, warrant flight from an n*f- -
of the law? Is [sic] so; Under what possible 
circumstances? 
9 
3. If in privacy, an individual is using marijuana; 
[sic] do you believe that any person or persons are 
offended? If so, in what way? 
(R. 233-35)-1 
Defendant particularly argues that the trial court's refusal 
to submit the first and third questions improperly curtailed his 
discovery of any biases or prejudices relating to his use of 
marijuana and his intelligent use of peremptory challenges. He 
also argues that the denial of the second and third question 
similarly compromised his defense of free agency. Appellant's 
Br. at 15-17. As reasonable as these arguments may appear on 
their face, they are completely without merit when considered in 
the totality of the trial court's questioning and the defendant's 
sole defense of free agency. 
Prior to trial defendant, pro se, informed the trial court 
that he intended to present a defense of "free agency" (R. 183).2 
The gist of the defense appears to be that everyone has the 
inherent right, i.e., free agency, to make decisions for 
themselves, and act accordingly. Any attempts to infringe on 
1
 The relevant portion of the trial court's voir dire and the 
recitation and colloquy of defendant's requested questions is 
attached at Addendum B (R. 217-37). 
2
 The trial court conducted voir dire pursuant to State v. 
Bakalov, 862 P.2d 1354 (Utah 1993) (R. 181). There is no claim on 
appeal that defendant's waiver of this right to counsel was not 
voluntary, knowing and intelligent. 
10 
anothei i 1 i ^ < rtLjpnnry im ludinu 1 <-:,'j I r-i J at ;i ve enactments, are 
offensive and may be resisted (R, Jb4 t|M 3 
II in apparent thai a defense of free agency Is incompatible 
wit; dad attempts lu uni i i i it le^ i.* lal ft- " , i nw»" T to define 
and enforce the criminal code,4 The trial court ..i^in-.cu 
pi ./Sp-". I ,', i- ,..i \ - " ', i" " ,MIJ
 m a ndatory thaf the 1 .:.^w c ^ law 
as the court instructed without regard for vJm i . .--• 
i iw wis or should b^ \\< /2M \ ' inquired whetnei 
prospective juiLi'b i-uuM mil I * M rors 
signaled their dissent |L ;/"H . 
?
 Defendant presented h,;:- * i + *e age;..y detense in hiw 
closing argumer* n ^ ^ ^ e d a^ A^-^ r ". . C (R. 354-65) . Exemplary 
remarks are: 
At: nave cm maij-onciiDle r*;-,...., L~ >* .A: 
fce..efs and to our own sense of moral it• 
we \: - *: b£- master- of own destiny, then w e 
mus: tria;r,:a.' ' -r * *-e aaencv f? ^ a * 
Ir.r defense pleadt w;r : - j . ~ find 
a ruling ?' r.^ t guilty baseo :;.-. r* ly en 
insufficient evidence, but r\«-r r^rr 
importantly, based en section :i<><-
art: \ - 1 cf the Utah Const it a* .-jn; and even 
more importantly K^c^-i - the Utah 
Constitution--or * n-
Con s tin u 110' * *ii# r s J a * i ^ „ -
pursuit of happiness 
The defendant prays '!._._
 J . *., , 
recognIze the need • uphoId t r,esr 
constitutions and create a means where 
society may return to freedoms therein 
4
 The trial court refused to give defendant's "free agency" 
instruction (R. 96, attached at Addendum D) because defendant 
evidently requested that it be presented as the law of Utah (R , 
341) . 
11 
Plainly, defendant's questions were intended to identify 
jurors that would deviate from their promise to follow the law as 
instructed, i.e., select jurors who would support jury 
nullification. £££ State v. Young. 853 P.2d 327, 387 n.8 (Utah 
1993)(Durham, J., dissenting from lead opinion discussing death-
qualification of jury) ("Nullifiers are by definition unable to 
fulfill their obligation as jurors to make an impartial decision 
at either the guilt or penalty phase, and therefore, their 
exclusion from all stages of a capital trial is proper."). 
The trial court correctly recognized that defendant's 
questions improperly attempted to focus the jury on fallacious 
view of the law. The court implicitly adopted the State's 
objection to the first question as "inappropriate" (R. 234). It 
rejected the second question because there had been no suggestion 
that Officer Turner was violating the law in pursuing defendant 
(R. 234) .5 The trial court's response to the third question, and 
a fourth question, the trial court's response to which is left 
conspicuously unchallenged on appeal, summarize the true context 
and purpose of defendant's questions: 
THE COURT[after reading the third question]: 
It's against the law in the State of Utah to 
5
 In fact, a common law right to resist an illegal search or 
arrest no longer exists in Utah; such defense exists only if 
provided for in the specific code section under which the defendant 
is charged. State v. Gardiner, 814 P.2d 568, 574 (Utah 1991). 
Neither section 76-5-102.4, providing for assault on a peace 
officer, or section 41-6-13.5, providing for failure to respond to 
an officer's signal to stop, provide for an offender's right to 
resist or flee lawful police action. 
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use mai"j"juana in any way* That's an Improper 
question "I .':L»n't care if its offensive-
it's against t he 1a w o f t he St. a t e o f T - -
And !;,-• ^as: - I>c you understand the 
difference between the letter of the law and 
the spirit of the law? If so, what is ci 
greater importance to folic* 
I would be lnsiiui . . ^*, L: • . i* }:„~y 
must follow tr e lav ,„• sc instruct the-
don * ;;aie afcwUt t - letter or the spirit, 
the way you've put it. 1 instruct them on 
the law and they must follow the law a£ : s 
instruct then Therefore I would deny y: 
right v a;— r~ those thiee cruesti^p 
(K 2* 6) a^-n-: ~r~ : -?t :.:r;s . :t :r.c.. context -'- apparent 
t ha t t he > c :* - - . - •=> n - - f \ -* u * c r s 
who woulc: misapply zr.e . , i.,
 JK}J^ . ^ ,, :-. . . 
Ih»...' | 'Id ii -" * omobile acciden*- •••.-r ^ ? questions r.a-^ e : <-. 
faith becaus- . v ^ w ^ . *,...>-:.. 
existenc.f- '' f . ^ r ~ . 2 • *. ~;sui an > •>- r • - ; * . *. t iMont? to 
an impart„ -
The :i . al Court Asked Questions Adequate 
to Uncover Jurors' Attitudes, Including any 
Possible Bias and Prejudice 
The totality xA t.hj court 
with adequate information to evaluate juror bias and !.;«.« 
intel ligenl.. "J ,, exercise Iri-n peremptory challenges The c o m t 
asked the venire whether 1111 1 hey coul.d. nvL \\t\\\n\ taitJy and 
weicilri impartially the evidence in reaching a verdict; (2) they or 
their immediate tdiiu Ly iiiernbiri ;•. had beei/j rhn rqed nv convicted of a 
felony; (3) they or then: family members had ever been the 
but»jei I i HI i t *niTif.vi", ill... s i - o p i y a police officer resulting in an 
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altercation, verbal or with fists, whether or not arrested or 
taken into custody; and (4) they had ever been charged or 
convicted of possession or distribution of illegal drugs (R. 217-
21). No juror responded affirmatively to any of these questions. 
Later in its voir dire the court addressed defendant's defense of 
free agency: 
THE COURT: My question is whether there are 
any of you who could not sit and listen to 
the evidence [sic] listen to the instructions 
on the law, and make a decision as to the 
guilt or innocence of another individual, the 
defendant in this case. 
If any of you could not do this, please so 
indicate by raising your hands. The court 
sees no hands. 
Now members of the jury, I have been advised 
that one of the defenses that is going to be 
raised in this case is the defense of free 
agency. You're obligated to listen to all 
the defenses that are raised, whatever they 
might be. My question to you is whether any 
of you on the panel would not listen and pay 
strict attention to the defendant, Mr. 
Shrewsbury, as he presents his defense on 
free agency. If any of you would not give 
him strict attention and listen to that 
defense and weigh it accordingly, if any of 
you could not do this, please so indicate by 
raising your hands. The court sees no hands. 
(R. 229-30) . The foregoing questions went to the heart of 
defendant's defense, and, considering the lack of response, 
adequately informed defendant about the jury's lack of bias. See 
Sherard. 818 P.2d at 559 (finding the trial court's series of 
questions sufficient to inform the defendant of the juror's 
attitudes and experiences). 
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defendant compares the questions he was denied with that 
denie. : dal I hi ll il «>"«is< I h<j defendant was convicted of 
dr:vi:.g under the influence of alcohol, In i: espuiiui I1 i 
q, - ':.Td] veniremen said they did not drink IH. 1,056), In 
holding ' ,dt it was revers i b I v .,n i l« i, efus-e a follow-up 
question asking whether the abstention from drinking was due " 
religj OI,J:.I OJ |,J«,I, soi'ia I, canv ictiun, the court reasoned thai .„t 
perse who abstains from alcohol out ol a it I j y urns LTiivict ITI 
r •-:>re likely in think ill, of anyone who drinks, and 
thereicie might. i,.oL acl i inijar f„ 1 a I, ly Bal 1 i^H1* P 2d at 106U. 
Defendant's requested questions, however, do not elicit 
mi i„!i,i;, iiiiC'T n personal attitudes. The first two 
quest- icr::- ask i f the j LIJ, oi, be! leves an i nd i, v i d'ua I i'tia y v i r» 1 a f t\ the 
State's controlled substance and traffic laws, The third 
question asks wheLhei l.li< existing "Inw prohibitinq the use o£ 
mariiuana should be changed None ol these questions are 
tt'lcMiiii I Ii t In iiJTor's personal attitudes about marijuana 
use i ir flight ficm law en tor cement, ol f, ,i L i « I n w< HI 111 a f f e«" t I i:< 
part i a] i ty fifi£ State v. Tuero,, 74 5 F" 2d 1281, 1283 (Utah App 
,1 yu '" I (guest 11 HI ask i n>.| m I i n i 11 in rihl I hi nl' pena 11" i es for dri v i ng 
undei influence too harsh was it relevant because seiil, tin I H M MMI 
wifh,in I he province of thp juiy's and so invited confusion); 
State v. Darling. < I1 ,'-1 , ', ??'' ?\ (Fan 197? I (moral 
attitude of venireman as the desirability o,i undesirability ot 
abo] I Ions irnnvif er i, a I in cha 1 ! enqr* to conviction for procuring an 
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abortion conviction where the material point was whether the jury 
could consider the case on the law without bias or prejudice).6 
POINT II 
AN ADEQUATE CHAIN OF CUSTODY SUPPORTED THE 
ADMISSION OF MARIJUANA, WHICH DEFENDANT 
ADMITTED HE POSSESSED WHEN ARRESTED 
Defendant argues that the State failed to show an adequate 
chain of custody because there was no testimony about how 
marijuana seized from his person at the time of his arrest was 
transported to the State Crime Laboratory. Also, because he 
testified that the marijuana produced at trial looked different 
than that which was seized from him, defendant argues that it was 
error to admit the marijuana into evidence. Appellant's Br. at 
19-21. Defendant's claim fails because an adequate chain of 
6
 Even if it was error to refuse defendant's requested 
questions, the error was at most harmless. "An error is harmful if 
the likelihood of a different result is "'sufficiently high to 
undermine confidence in the verdict.'"" State v. Olsen. 869 P.2d 
1004, (Utah App. 1993) (citing State v. Hamilton. 827 P.2d 232, 240 
(Utah 1992) quoting State v. Knight, 734 P.2d 913, 920 (Utah 
1987)). &££ Chase v. United States. 468 F.2d 141, 147 (7th Cir. 
1972) (finding any error of omission in voir dire harmless because 
evidence of guilt was overwhelming). 
Defendant admitted having possession of marijuana and did not 
deny that he fled from Officer Turner. Indeed, defendant's "free 
agency" defense implicitly acknowledged his offensive conduct. The 
trial court instructed the jury on the elements of the offenses 
charged (R. 128-40). None of the elements of the offenses charged 
provided a free agency defense, either as described by defendant in 
closing (R. 354-60) or in the limited "free agency" instruction 
allowed by the court (R. 121). Given this scenario, the jury had 
no recourse other than to convict defendant of possession of 
marijuana with intent to distribute, failure to respond to an 
officer's signal to stop and giving a false name to an officer. 
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custody was established. Further, there was evidence 
contradicting defendant's testimony regarding the appearance of 
the marijuana, and, in any case, defendant admitted possession of 
the drug. 
A. Only a Prima Facie Case is Required for Authentication 
Rule 901, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: "The 
requirement of authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to 
support a finding that the matter in question is what its 
proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(a).7 "The rule does not 
erect a particularly high hurdle." United States v. Ortiz. 966 
F.2d 707, 716 (1st Cir. 1992) (admitting evidence even though 
government testimony did not establish the manner in which 
cocaine was sent from its point of seizure to its point of 
testing), cert, denied, Ortiz v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 1005 
(1993) . "The rule requires only that the court admit evidence if 
sufficient proof has been introduced so that a reasonable juror 
could find in favor of authenticity or identification. The rest 
is up to the jury." 5 Jack B. Weinstein & Margaret A. Berger, 
Weinstein's Evidence § 901(a) [01] at 901-19 (1994). "A break in 
the chain of custody will not necessarily lead to the exclusion 
of the evidence. . . . Rather, ! [T]he ultimate question is 
whether the authentication testimony [i]s sufficiently complete 
7
 Rule 901 is virtually identical to the rule 901, Federal 
Rules of Evidence, from which it is plainly derived. 
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so as to convince the court that it is improbable that the 
original item had been exchanged with another or otherwise 
tampered with." United States v. Grant, 967 F.2d 81, 82 (2nd 
Cir. 1992) (requiring only a preponderance of evidence to admit 
heroin missing from evidence vault for fourteen days without 
records to account for the interim) (citations omitted), cert. 
denied, Grant v, United States, H 3 s. ct. 1293 (1993); United 
States v. Mendel, 746 F.2d 155, 167 (2nd Cir. 1984) (same), cert. 
denied, Mendel v. United States, 469 u.s. 1213, 105 s. ct. ii84 
(1985). 
This Court has followed the federal standard. In State v. 
Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 498 P.2d 670 (1972), the defendant 
appealed a conviction for selling a stimulant drug. The State 
established a clear and definitive chain of custody of the drug 
from the time the substance had been obtained from the defendant 
until it was produced at trial except that the pill bottle 
containing the sample was unsealed and markings on the plastic 
bag containing the bottle had been obliterated when produced in 
court. In rejecting the defendant's challenge that a chain of 
custody had not been sufficiently shown, the court stated: 
Before a physical object or substance 
connected with the commission of a crime is 
admissible in evidence there must be a 
showing that the proposed exhibit is in 
substantially the same condition as at the 
time of a crime. The circumstances 
surrounding the preservation and custody of 
the article and the likelihood of tampering 
are factors to be considered in determining 
its admissibility. If after consideration of 
18 
these factors the trial court is satisfied 
that the article or substance has not been 
changed or altered, he may permit its 
introduction into evidence . . . . The ruling 
of the trial court in this regard will not be 
overturned unless there is a showing of abuse 
of discretion. 
Id. at 672. In State v. Bradshaw. 680 P.2d 1036 (Utah 1984), the 
Utah Supreme Court applied this standard to refute a claim that 
the chain of custody of a controlled substance was broken at the 
point at which it was mailed to a state chemist for analysis. In 
finding that the particular sample was in substantially the same 
condition when introduced into evidence as it was when the crime 
was committed, and therefore admissible, the court stated: 
Where the evidence has passed through several 
hands, circumstances surrounding chain of 
possession are relevant in making this 
assessment. However, the party proffering 
the exhibit is not required to eliminate 
every conceivable possibility that the 
evidence may have been altered. Some 
jurisdictions have held that where no 
evidence has been offered to suggest 
tampering, proffered evidence is admissible 
if the chain of evidence is otherwise 
adequately established. A weak link in the 
chain and any doubt created by it go to the 
weight to be given the evidence once the 
trial court has exercised the discretion to 
conclude that in reasonable probability the 
proffered evidence has not been changed in 
any important respect. 
Id. at 1039 (citations omitted). 
"Once evidence is in the hands of the [State], it is 
generally presumed that the exhibits were handled with 
regularity, absent an affirmative showing of bad faith or actual 
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tampering." State v. Eaale Book. Inc.. 583 P.2d 73, 75 (Utah 
1978) (citation omitted). 
Following these principles this Court rejected a challenge 
to a chain of custody in a narcotics case factually similar to 
this one. In State v. Wynia. undercover agents placed drug 
evidence following a sting operation in marked, sealed envelopes 
and deposited them in the night deposit bin of the Salt Lake City 
evidence room. State v. Wynia. 754 P.2d 667, 669 (Utah App. 
1988), cert, denied. 756 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1988). At trial the 
officers identified the envelopes and their contents, referring 
to their own handwriting on the exhibits. Id. Another officer 
received the envelopes from the evidence custodian and delivered 
them to a criminalist at the State toxicology lab, who, in turn, 
delivered the envelopes to lab technicians who performed the 
analysis. Id. The Court held that the failure of the 
criminalist to testify as to his receiving and delivering the 
envelopes was at most a weak link in the chain of custody. Id. 
at 671. 
B. An Adequate Chain of Custody was Established 
At the time of arrest, Officer Turner found in defendant's 
fanny pack three baggies of a green leafy substance which field 
tested positive for marijuana (Exhibits 6,7 & 8, R. 273-74). Two 
of the baggies were apparently in a larger bag, separated from 
the third baggie. The officer discarded the larger bag and 
placed the three baggies of marijuana in a property bag, which he 
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sealed, and to which he attached a paper identifying the contents 
with his signature (Exhibit 2, R. 272, 281). At trial Officer 
Turner identified the property bag and the three baggies as those 
he had obtained from defendant (R. 172-73). Officer Turner took 
the property bag to the evidence room at the Highway Patrol 
Office where he placed it in a secured evidence locker (R. 277). 
He testified that from this secured locker the evidence custodian 
would have removed the bag and placed it in her secured evidence 
locker, "that they have access to" (R. 278). 
The criminalist, Jennifer Angus, testified that according 
to her evidence property notes the property bag was brought into 
the lab by Utah Highway Patrolman Robert Humphrey and signed for 
by Scott Smoot [sic] (R. 315, 318-19; Exhibit 9, attached at 
Addendum E) .8 Her lab notes also indicated that the material she 
tested was the material placed in exhibit 2, the property bag, 
because the Utah Highway Patrol case number (#049400167) on the 
label attached to exhibit 2 was the same as that on her notes (R. 
319). The same case number also appears on the "Seized Vehicle 
Report Form/ which notes "2 baggies in plastic bag, 1 baggie 
outside bag," further confirming that the contents seized was 
that which the criminalist analyzed (Exhibit 10, attached at 
Addendum F). The material in the three baggies tested positive 
for marijuana (R. 316). 
8
 The correct name of the criminalist is Scott Spjut (Exhibit 
9) . 
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Defendant mistakenly argues that the absence of evidence 
concerning how the evidence was secured, labeled, transported and 
identified after it was placed in Officer Turner's locker 
constitutes a "gap" in the chain of custody. Appellant's Br. at 
20. Officer Turner testified that both his and the evidence 
custodian's lockers were secured by locks. He and Ms. Angus 
collectively testified that the labels on the property bag 
identified the bag to this case. The weak links in this chain 
are the absence of testimony from the evidence custodian, Officer 
Humphrey, who transported exhibit 2 and Scott Spjut, who received 
it. However, these omissions are substantially like those in 
Wynia. Even if any one of these links if regarded as missing, 
such determination is, contrary to defendant's unsupported 
argument, not fatal to admission, see Grant, 967 F.2d at 82, 
supra p. 6, because the trial court's ultimate ruling as to 
admission is a determination about whether "the proposed evidence 
is in substantially the same condition as at the time of the 
crime." Madsen. 28 Utah 2d at 110, 498 P.2d at 672, or, 
alternatively, that under rule 901(a), "the [evidence] is what 
its proponent claims." Utah R. Evid. 901(a). 
At trial defendant never suggested that the evidence had 
been tampered with, but merely stated that "[i]t doesn't look 
like the marijuana I had in my possession" (R. 331). However, 
both Officers Turner and McCleeve testified that the marijuana in 
the three baggies exhibited at trial appeared to be the same as 
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that taken from defendant (R. 273, 294). Further, defendant 
substantially qualified his comment when, in closing, he conceded 
that the change he perceived in the marijuana might be due to 
fermentation (R. 363) . Upon these facts the marijuana evidence 
was properly admitted.9 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing discussion, the State respectfully 
requests that the trial court's rulings denying defendant's 
requested voir dire questions and objection to the chain of 
custody be upheld and defendant's convictions be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /f day of December, 1995. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
9
 In any event, any error in admitting the marijuana evidence 
is harmless in the face of defendant's admission of his possession 
at the time of arrest (R. 331). 
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Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 
Rule 18. Selection of jury. 
(a) The clerk shall draw by lot and call the number of 
the jurors that are to try the cause plus such an 
additional number as will allow for all peremptory 
challenges permitted. After each challenge for cause 
sustained, another juror shall be called to fill the 
vacancy before further challenges are made, and any 
such new juror may be challenged for cause. When the 
challenges for cause are completed, the clerk shall 
make a list of the jurors remaining, and each side, 
beginning with the prosecution, shall indicate thereon 
its peremptory challenge to one juror at a time in 
regular turn, as the court may direct, until all 
peremptory challenges are exhausted or waived. The 
clerk shall then call the remaining jurors, or so many 
of them as shall be necessary to constitute the jury, 
in the order in which they appear on the list, and the 
persons whose names are so called shall constitute the 
jury. 
(b) The court may permit counsel or the defendant to 
conduct the examination of the prospective jurors or 
may itself conduct the examination. In the latter 
event, the court may permit counsel or the defendant to 
supplement the examination by such further inquiry as 
it deems proper, or may itself submit to the 
prospective jurors additional questions requested by 
counsel or the defendant. 
(c) A challenge may be made to the panel or to an 
individual j uror. 
(1) The panel is a list of jurors called to 
serve at a particular court or for the trial 
of a particular action. A challenge to the 
panel is an objection made to all jurors 
summoned and may be taken by either party. 
(i) A challenge to the panel can be founded 
only on a material departure from the 
procedure prescribed with respect to the 
selection, drawing, summoning and return of 
the panel. 
(ii) The challenge to the panel shall be 
taken before the jury is sworn and shall be 
in writing or recorded by the reporter. It 
shall specifically set forth the facts 
constituting the grounds of the challenge. 
(iii) If a challenge to the panel is opposed 
by the adverse party, a hearing may be had to 
try any question of fact upon which the 
challenge is based. The jurors challenged, 
and any other persons, may be called as 
witnesses at the hearing thereon, 
(iv) The court shall decide the challenge. If 
the challenge to the panel is allowed, the 
court shall discharge the jury so far as the 
trial in question is concerned. If a 
challenge is denied, the court shall direct 
the selection of jurors to proceed. 
(2) A challenge to an individual juror may be 
either peremptory or for cause. A challenge to an 
individual juror may be made only before the jury 
is sworn to try the action, except the court may, 
for good cause, permit it to be made after the 
juror is sworn but before any of the evidence is 
presented. In challenges for cause the rules 
relating to challenges to a panel and hearings 
thereon shall apply. All challenges for cause 
shall be taken first by the prosecution and then 
by the defense. 
(d) A peremptory challenge is an objection to a juror 
for which no reason need be given. In capital cases, 
each side is entitled to 10 peremptory challenges. In 
other felony cases each side is entitled to four 
peremptory challenges. In misdemeanor cases, each side 
is entitled to three peremptory challenges. If there is 
more than one defendant the court may allow the 
defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit 
them to be exercised separately or jointly. 
(e) The challenge for cause is an objection to a 
particular juror and may be taken on one or more of the 
following grounds: 
(1) want of any of the qualifications 
prescribed by law; 
(2) any mental or physical infirmity which 
renders one incapable of performing the 
duties of a juror; 
(3) consanguinity or affinity within the 
fourth degree to the person alleged to be 
injured by the offense charged, or on whose 
complaint the prosecution was instituted; 
(4) the existence of any social, legal, 
business, fiduciary or other relationship 
between the prospective juror and any party, 
witness or person alleged to have been 
victimized or injured by the defendant, which 
relationship when viewed objectively, would 
suggest to reasonable minds that the 
prospective juror would be unable or 
unwilling to return a verdict which would be 
free of favoritism. A prospective juror shall 
not be disqualified solely because he is 
indebted to or employed by the state or a 
political subdivision thereof; 
(5) having been or being the party adverse to 
the defendant in a civil action, or having 
complained against or having been accused by 
him in a criminal prosecution; 
(6) having served on the grand jury which 
found the indictment; 
(7) having served on a trial jury which has 
tried another person for the particular 
offense charged; 
(8) having been one of a jury formally sworn 
to try the same charge, and whose verdict was 
set aside, or which was discharged without a 
verdict after the case was submitted to it; 
(9) having served as a juror in a civil 
action brought against the defendant for the 
act charged as an offense; 
(10) if the offense charged is punishable 
with death, the entertaining of such 
conscientious opinions about the death 
penalty as would preclude the juror from 
voting to impose the death penalty following 
conviction regardless of the facts; 
(11) because he is or, within one year 
preceding, has been engaged or interested in 
carrying on any business, calling or 
employment, the carrying on of which is a 
violation of law, where defendant is charged 
with a like offense; 
(12) because he has been a witness, either 
for or against the defendant on the 
preliminary examination or before the grand 
jury; 
(13) having formed or expressed an 
unqualified opinion or belief as to whether 
the defendant is guilty or not guilty of the 
offense charged; or 
(14) that a state of mind exists on the part 
of the juror with reference to the cause, or 
to either party, which will prevent him from 
acting impartially and without prejudice to 
the substantial rights of the party 
challenging; but no person shall be 
disqualified as a juror by reason of having 
formed or expressed an opinion upon the 
matter or cause to be submitted to such jury, 
founded upon public rumor, statements in 
public journals or common notoriety, if it 
satisfactorily appears to the court that the 
juror can and will, notwithstanding such 
opinion, act impartially and fairly upon the 
matter to be submitted to him. 
(f) Peremptory challenges shall be taken first by the 
prosecution and then by the defense alternately. 
Challenges for cause shall be completed before 
peremptory challenges are taken. 
(g) The court may direct that alternate jurors be 
impanelled. Alternate jurors, in the order in which 
they are called, shall replace jurors who are, or 
become, unable or disqualified to perform their duties. 
The prosecution and defense shall each have one 
additional peremptory challenge for each alternate 
juror to be chosen. 
Alternate jurors shall have the same qualifications, 
take the same oath and enjoy the same privileges as 
regular jurors. 
(h) A statutory exemption from service as a juror is a 
privilege of the person exempted and is not a ground 
for challenge for cause. 
(i) When the jury is selected an oath shall be 
administered to the jurors, in substance, that they and 
each of them will well and truly try the matter in 
issue between the parties, and render a true verdict 
according to the evidence and the instructions of the 
court. 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Rule 901. Requirement of authentication or identification. 
(a) General provision. The requirement of 
authentication or identification as a condition 
precedent to admissibility is satisfied by evidence 
sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims. 
(b) Illustrations. By way of illustration only, and not 
by way of limitation, the following are examples of 
authentication or identification conforming with the 
requirements of this rule: 
(1) Testimony of witness with knowledge. 
Testimony that a matter is what it is claimed 
to be. 
(2) Nonexpert opinion on handwriting. 
Nonexpert opinion as to the genuineness of 
handwriting, based upon familiarity not 
acquired for purposes of the litigation. 
(3) Comparison by trier or expert witness. 
Comparison by the trier of fact or by expert 
witnesses with specimens which have been 
authenticated. 
(4) Distinctive characteristics and the like. 
Appearance, contents, substance, internal 
patterns, or other distinctive 
characteristics, taken in conjunction with 
circumstances. 
(5) Voice identification. Identification of a 
voice, whether heard firsthand or through 
mechanical or electronic transmission or 
recording, by opinion based upon hearing the 
voice at any time under circumstances 
connecting it with the alleged speaker. 
(6) Telephone conversations. Telephone 
conversations, by evidence that a call was 
made to the number assigned at the time by 
the telephone company to a particular person 
or business, if (A) in the case of a person, 
circumstances, including self-identification, 
show the person answering to be the one 
called, or (B) in the case of a business, the 
call was made to a place of business and the 
conversation related to business reasonably 
transacted over the telephone. 
(7) Public records or reports. Evidence that 
a writing authorized by law to be recorded or 
filed and in fact recorded or filed in a 
public office, or a purported public record, 
report, statement, or data compilation, in 
any form, is from the public office where 
items of this nature are kept. 
(8) Ancient documents or data compilation. 
Evidence that a document or data compilation, 
in any form, (A) is in such condition as to 
create no suspicion concerning its 
authenticity, (B) was in a place where it, if 
authentic, would likely be, and (C) has been 
in existence 20 years or more at the time it 
is offered. 
(9) Process or system. Evidence describing a 
process or system used to produce a result 
and showing that the process or system 
produces an accurate result. 
(10) Methods provided by statute or rule. Any 
method of authentication or identification 
provided by court rule or statute of this 
state. 
ADDENDUM B 
THE COURT: DO YOU KNOW THEM INCIDENT TO YOUR 
RESPONSIBILITIES WHICH YOU HAVE OFFICIALLY OR DO YOU 
ASSOCIATE WITH THEM SOCIALLY? 
VENIREMAN GARY: NO, I JUST KNOW THEM IN THE 
RESPONSIBILITIES OF MY POSITION. 
THE COURT: STRICTLY IN A BUSINESS RELATIONSHIP 
OR PROFESSIONAL CAPACITY? 
VENIREMAN GRAY: YES. 
THE COURT: I WOULD ASK YOU, SIR, THE FACT THAT 
YOU MAY KNOW THEM, WHETHER THAT WOULD INFLUENCE IN ANY 
WAY SUCH THAT YOU COULD NOT SIT AND LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE OF 
THIS CASE AND GIVE THIS DEFENDANT AND THE STATE OF UTAH A FAIR 
AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. IF YOU COULD NOT DO SO, PLEASE SO INDICATE 
BY RAISING YOUR HAND. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
THE DEFENDANT TODAY IS REPRESENTED BY MR. 
ROBERT STEELE. MR. STEELE, IF YOU WOULD PLEASE STAND. MR. 
STEELE IS AN ATTORNEY LICENSED TO PRACTICE LAW HERE IN THE 
STATE OF UTAH. I WOULD ASK YOU IF ANY OF YOU KNOW MR. STEELE, 
WHETHER HE'S DONE LEGAL WORK FOR YOU OR WHETHER YOU KNOW 
HIM IN A SOCIAL CAPACITY IN ANY WAY. IF ANY OF YOU KNOW HIM IN 
ANY WAY, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT 
SEES NO HANDS. 
LET ME ALSO INDICATE TO YOU, MEMBERS OF THE 
JURY, THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE HAS REQUESTED THAT HE 
HAVE THE RIGHT, WHICH IT IS HIS RIGHT UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, TO 
IS 
A t 
TAKE PART IN THE DEFENSE OR TO TAKE PART IN THE TRIAL, OR IN 
OTHER WORDS, WHAT I'M SAYING IS, HE WILL BE REPRESENTING 
HIMSELF IN CERTAIN PHASES OF THIS TRIAL, AND MR. STEELE WILL BE 
ADVISING HIM AS FAR AS THE LAW AND PROCEDURE AND SO FORTH 
AND IN ANY OTHER WAY IN WHICH MR. STEELE CAN AID HIM. 
HE MADE THAT REQUEST, THE COURT HAS DISCUSSED 
THAT WITH HIM, AND THAT'S WHAT HIS DESIRE IS. SO YOU WILL BE 
HEARING FROM HIM ALSO IN REPRESENTATION OF HIMSELF. 
MR STEELE, I WOULD ASK YOU TO ASK YOUR CLIENT 
TO PLEASE STAND AND TO INTRODUCE HIM TO THE MEMBERS OF THE 
JURY, AND ASK HIM TO TURN SO ALL MEMBERS OF THE JURY MAY SEE 
HIM 
MR STEELE THIS IS KENNETH NOLAN SHREWSBURY. 
THE COURT: I WOULD ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE 
JURY, IF ANY OF YOU KNOW MR. SHREWSBURY, WHETHER YOU KNOW 
HIM, WHETHER YOU'VE HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT HIM, WHETHER YOU 
HAVE HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT THIS CASE IN ANY WAY. IF ANY OF 
YOU DO KNOW MR SHREWSBURY OR YOU'VE HEARD ANYTHING ABOUT 
THIS CASE, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT 
SEES NO HANDS. 
COUNSEL, WOULD YOU READ THE NAME OF THE 
WITNESSES YOU INTEND TO CALL. 
MR. STEELE: YOUR HONOR, MR. SHREWSBURY MAY BE 
TESTIFYING HIMSELF AND THE COURT HAS INQUIRED ABOUT HIM. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, COUNSEL. I WOULD ASK 
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1 YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF ANY OF YOU HAVE SERVED ON A JURY 
2 BEFORE AT ANY TIME, ANY PLACE. IF ANY OF YOU HAVE SERVED ON A 
3 JURY BEFORE, AT ANY TIME, ANY PLACE, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY 
4 RAISING YOUR HANDS. 
5 I WOULD ASK THOSE WHO RESPONDED TO THIS 
6 QUESTION TO PLEASE STATE WHEN IT WAS, WHERE IT WAS, AND WHAT 
7 TYPE OF CASE IT WAS TO THE BEST OF YOUR ABILITY. 
8 VENIREMAN LARSEN: I BELIEVE IT WAS IN THIS 
9 COURT. IT WAS A DU1 CASE. IT WAS THE EARLY 70'S. I DON'T 
10 REMEMBER THE EXACT TIME. 
11 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
12 VENIREMAN ASHBY: IT WAS OVER AT FEDERAL 
13 COURT. IT WAS A TITLE COMPANY VERSUS SOME CONDOMINIUM 
14 OWNERS. 
15 THE COURT: HOW LONG AGO WAS THAT? 
16 VENIREMAN ASHBY: TWELVE YEARS AGO. 
17 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
18 VENIREMAN COOK: IT WAS JUNE OF'85, A 
19 MALPRACTICE DOWN IN CALIFORNIA. 
20 THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
21 VENIREMAN BRUZENAK: IT WAS FEDERAL, TEN YEARS 
22 AGO. IT WAS ABOUT A FORGERY. 
23 THE COURT: TO THOSE OF YOU WHO RESPONDED, THE 
24 FACT THAT YOU HAVE HAD SOME BRUSH OR OPPORTUNITY TO BE IN 
251 THE SYSTEM, I WOULD ASK YOU WHETHER ANYTHING TOOK PLACE 
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SUCH THAT IT WOULD PREJUDICE YOU SUCH THAT YOU COULD NOT 
LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE IN THIS CASE AND GIVE THE STATE OF UTAH 
AND THE DEFENDANT A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. IF YOU COULD 
NOT DO SO, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT 
SEES NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF 
ANY OF YOU OR YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY-AND BY YOUR "IMMEDIATE 
FAMILY" I WOULD DEFINE THAT AS BEING YOUR HUSBAND, WIFE; SON 
OR DAUGHTER; MOTHER OR FATHER; BROTHER OR SISTER-IF ANY OF 
YOU OR YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH OR 
CONVICTED OF A FELONY. 
NOW A FELONY IS THE MOST SERIOUS TYPE OF CRIME 
IN CONTRAST TO MISDEMEANORS, WHICH GENERALLY ARE TRAFFIC 
VIOLATIONS. 
IF ANY OF YOU OR YOUR--ANY MEMBER OF YOUR 
IMMEDIATE FAMILY HAVE BEEN CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF A 
FELONY., PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT 
SEES NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF 
ANY OF YOU HAVE BEEN INVOLVED IN A SITUATION WHERE YOU HAVE 
BEEN DRIVING YOUR MOTOR VEHICLE, AND WHERE YOU HAVE BEEN 
STOPPED, AND IT RESULTED IN AN ALTERCATION; "ALTERCATION" 
BEING VERBAL OR FISTS OR OTHERWISE, ANY TYPE OF "ALTERCATION" 
WITH A PEACE OFFICER, WHERE YOU WERE ARRESTED AND TAKEN INTO 
CUSTODY. IF ANY OF YOU FIND YOURSELF IN THIS SITUATION, PLEASE 
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SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF 
ANY OF YOU HAVE EVER BEEN STOPPED WHILE DRIVING A MOTOR 
VEHICLE WHICH RESULTED IN A STRONG ALTERCATION WITH A PEACE 
OFFICER, BUT WHERE YOU HAVE NOT BEEN ARRESTED. IF ANY OF YOU 
FIND YOURSELVES IN THIS SITUATION, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING 
YOUR HANDS. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF 
ANY OF YOU HAVE EVER BEEN CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF 
POSSESSION OF ANY TYPE OF ILLEGAL DRUGS, PARTICULARLY SOME 
MARIJUANA, COCAINE, HEROINE AND SO FORTH. IF ANY OF YOU HAVE 
BEEN CHARGED WITH OR CONVICTED OF POSSESSION OF OR THE 
DISTRIBUTION OF ANY ILLEGAL DRUGS, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY 
RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF 
ANY OF YOU OR YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY HAVE EMPLOYMENT AS A 
LAW OFFICER IN ENFORCING THE LAWS, WHETHER THEY BE FEDERAL 
LAWS, STATE LAWS, CITY OR PRIVATE LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS. IF 
ANY OF YOU OR YOUR IMMEDIATE FAMILY-WHICH I HAVE DEFINED TO 
YOU--ARE INVOLVED LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK, PLEASE SO INDICATE 
BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. 
VENIREMAN GRAY: (INDICATING) 
THE COURT: SIR, YOU INDICATED YOU'RE A POLICE 
CHIEF OF SOUTH SALT LAKE. YOU'RE CURRENTLY SO? 
VENIREMAN GRAY: YES, SIR. 
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THE COURT: NEXT IN LINE? 
VENIREMAN LARSEN: MY BROTHER-IN-LAW WAS A 
PATROL OFFICER, AND MY NEPHEW IS A POLICE OFFICER IN LEHI. 
THE COURT: A PATROL OFFICER WITH THE STATE OF 
UTAH? 
VENIREMAN LARSEN: YES. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. NEXT? 
VENIREMAN COOK: I'M AN AGENT OF THE US FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION. I'M AN ENFORCER OF THE FOOD AND 
DRUG AND COSMETIC ACT. 
VENIREMAN LINDLEY: I HAVE A BROTHER WHO IS ON 
THE RESERVE FOR PAYSON CITY POLICE. 
THE COURT: LET ME ASK THE FOUR OR FIVE OF YOU 
WHO RESPONDED TO THIS QUESTION. THE FACT THAT YOU ARE 
INVOLVED IN LAW ENFORCEMENT WORK, OR THAT MEMBERS OF YOUR 
FAMILY ARE, AND THERE WILL BE OFFICERS CALLED TO TESTIFY IN 
THIS CASE, IT'S GOING TO BE YOUR RESPONSIBILITY TO SIT AND LISTEN 
TO THE TESTIMONY GIVEN BY THOSE POLICE OFFICERS AND TO WEIGH 
THAT TESTIMONY IN YOUR FAIR AND IMPARTIAL MINDS. 
MY QUESTION TO YOU IS WHETHER YOU COULD SIT 
AND LISTEN TO THAT TESTIMONY AND GIVE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL 
WEIGHT TO THE TESTIMONY, BUT BE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL, GIVE BOTH 
THE STATE AND THE DEFENDANT A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. IF ANY 
OF YOU COULD NOT DO SO, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR 
HANDS. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. LET ME ASK THE WHOLE PANEL, 
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MANY TIMES WE, AS CITIZENS, ARE DRIVING OUR MOTOR VEHICLE 
DOWN THE ROAD, AND WE SEE THAT RED LIGHT FLASHING IN BACK OF 
US, AND WE BEGIN TO WONDER, "WHAT DID I DO? DID I RUN THAT STOP 
SIGN0 DID--WAS I SPEEDING? DID I MAKE AN ILLEGAL TURN?" 
AND THE ADRENALIN FLOWS A LITTLE FASTER, AND 
WE PAY HEED AND ATTENTION TO WHAT THE OFFICER HAS TO SAY. 
MAYBE WE FELT THAT THE OFFICER WAS RUDE TO US. 
MAYBE WE FELT THAT THE PENALTY WAS TOO HARSH OR SEVERE, AND 
MAYBE WE SAID TO OURSELVES, "WELL, I'LL GET EVEN WITH HIM 
SOMEDAY." 
A COURT OF LAW IS NOT THE PLACE TO GET EVEN 
WITH AN OFFICER, NOR IS IT THE PLACE TO GIVE UNDUE WEIGHT TO 
THE TESTIMONY OF A POLICE OFFICER. 
WHAT I'M SAYING IS THIS: AN OFFICER, A POLICE 
OFFICER, MAY BE CALLED AS A WITNESS AND GIVE HIS TESTIMONY, 
AND YOU AS A MEMBER OF THE JURY MUST LISTEN TO THAT 
TESTIMONY AND WEIGH THAT TESTIMONY IN YOUR FAIR AND 
IMPARTIAL MIND AND GIVE IT THE WEIGHT THAT YOU FEEL IT IS 
ENTITLED TO, NOT MORE AND NOT LESS, BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT 
HE IS A POLICE OFFICER. 
YOU WEIGH HIS TESTIMONY THE SAME AS YOU 
WOULD THE TESTIMONY OF ANY OTHER INDIVIDUAL. 
MY QUESTION TO YOU IS WHETHER THERE ARE ANY 
OF YOU WHO COULD NOT SIT AND LISTEN TO THE TESTIMONY OF A 
POLICE OFFICER AND GIVE FAIR AND IMPARTIAL WEIGHT TO THAT 
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TESTIMONY, NOT MORE OR NOT LESS BY REASON OF THE FACT THAT HE 
IS A POLICE OFFICER. IF ANY OF YOU COULD NOT DO THIS, PLEASE SO 
INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HAND. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF 
ANY OF YOU HAVE HAD ANY STUDY OF THE LAW. NOW I DON'T MEAN 
NECESSARILY THAT YOU HAVE GRADUATED FROM LAW SCHOOL, BUT 
WHETHER YOU'VE ATTENDED ANY QUARTER OR SEMESTER OR YEAR IN 
ANY CERTIFIED LAW SCHOOL, AND I'M NOT TALKING OF COURSE ABOUT 
YOUR TAKING A CLASS IN CIVICS OR SOMETHING AS A BOY SCOUT OR 
SOMETHING OF THAT SORT. I'M TALKING ABOUT FORMAL TRAINING AS 
FAR AS THE LAW IS CONCERNED. 
IF ANY OF YOU HAVE HAD ANY FORMAL TRAINING OF 
THE LAW, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. 
VENIREMAN GRAY: MY DEGREE IS IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: THE PARALEGAL PROGRAM 
AT WESTMINSTER. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
VENIREMAN CARLESON: I'VE BEEN CERTIFIED FOR THE 
AMERICAN PARALEGAL ASSOCIATION AND HAVE TAUGHT SOME 
CLASSES. 
THE COURT: I GUESS THE TWO OF YOU, AS FAR AS 
PARALEGAL WORK, YOU WORK WITH ATTORNEYS? 
VENIREMAN CARLESON: THAT'S CORRECT. 
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THE COURT: I WOULD ASK ALL OF YOU, THOSE OF 
YOU WHO RESPONDED TO THIS QUESTION, THE FACT THAT YOU HAVE 
HAD SOME TRAINING OF THE LAW--WELL, LET ME INCLUDE THIS FOR 
ALL OF YOU--THAT THE COURT, AT A LATER TIME IN THE CASE, IS 
GOING TO BE GIVING YOU SOME INSTRUCTIONS. I'M GOING TO BE 
INSTRUCTING YOU IN WHAT THE LAW IS THAT WILL GOVERN A CASE OF 
THIS TYPE 
ITS MANDATORY THAT YOU FOLLOW THE LAW AS I SO 
INSTRUCT YOU. YOU DO NOT HAVE THE RIGHT TO DECIDE THIS CASE 
ON WHAT YOU THINK THE LAW IS OR WHAT YOU THINK THE LAW 
SHOULD BE. 
AND THAT'S EVEN THOUGH IT MAY BE YOUR TRAINING 
IN THE LAW, THAT YOU MIGHT LOOK AT IT AND THTNK ONE WAY. WHAT 
THE COURT INSTRUCTS YOU, YOU MUST STILL FOLLOW THE 
INSTRUCTIONS THE COURT GIVES YOU ON THE LAW. 
MY QUESTION TO YOU IS THIS: ALL OF YOU, WHETHER 
THERE ARE ANY OF YOU WHO COULD NOT FOLLOW THE COURT'S 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW AND DECIDE THIS CASE ON THE LAW OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH AS THE COURT SO INSTRUCTS YOU. IF ANY OF YOU 
COULD NOT DO THIS, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. 
THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
NOW MEMBERS OF THE JURY, COUNSEL FOR THE 
STATE IS A MEMBER OF THE SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. 
THERE ARE A NUMBER OF ATTORNEYS IN THAT OFFICE. I'M NOT GOING 
TO ATTEMPT-AND I PROBABLY COULDN'T NAME ALL THE NAMES OF 
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ALL THE ATTORNEYS IN THE OFFICE. 
BUT MY QUESTION TO YOU IS WHETHER YOU HAVE 
ANY ACQUAINTANCE OR FRIEND THAT YOU KNOW IS PRESENTLY 
SERVING IN THE SALT LAKE COUNTY DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE. IF 
ANY OF YOU DO KNOW ANY DEPUTIES IN THE SALT LAKE DISTRICT 
ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HAND. 
WELL, LET'S TRY THIS AGAIN. IF ANY OF YOU KNOW ANY PERSONS 
SERVING IN THE SALT LAKE DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE, PLEASE 
RAISE YOUR HANDS. SIR? 
VENIREMAN ALBERTINI: I DON'T REMEMBER HIS NAME 
RIGHT NOW, BUT MY ASSOCIATION, IN MY ASSOCIATION WITH THE 
RESERVES, IS A GENTLEMAN I--THAT WAS IN A CLASS WITH ME. 
THE COURT: MA'AM? 
VENIREMAN C. ANDERSON: BO BEHRENS, 1 BELIEVE. 
THE COURT: AND SIR? 
VENIREMAN GRAY: I'VE ASSOCIATED WITH NEAL 
GUNNARSON QUITE A BIT. 
VENIREMAN CARLESON: I KNOW NEAL GUNNARSON. 
ALSO RUTH MCCLOSKEY. 
THE COURT: NEXT IN LINE? 
VENIREMAN COOK: TO BE HONEST WITH YOU, I'M NOT 
SURE WHAT DISTRICT ATTORNEY, WHO HE'S WITH. 
THE COURT: HE'S WITH THE STATE, BUT THAT'S FINE. 
LET ME ASK THE ONES THAT RESPONDED TO THIS QUESTION, WHETHER 
THE FACT THAT YOU KNOW SOMEBODY WHO HAS SERVED IN THE 
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DISTRICT ATTORNEY'S OFFICE--THAT OFFICE HAS RESPONSIBILITY FOR 
ENFORCING CASES OF THIS TYPE--WHETHER THAT WOULD PREJUDICE 
YOU IN ANY WAY SUCH THAT YOU COULD NOT LISTEN TO THE 
EVIDENCE OF THIS CASE AND GIVE THE STATE AND THE DEFENDANT A 
FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. IF ANY OF YOU COULD NOT DO SO, PLEASE 
SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF ANY 
OF YOU HAVE BEEN CALLED AS A WITNESS TO TESTIFY IN A COURT OF 
LAW. I WOULD ASK YOU IF ANY OF YOU HAVE BEEN CALLED AND 
HAVE TESTIFIED IN A COURT OF LAW. PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING 
YOUR HANDS. STATE WHEN IT WAS, WHERE IT WAS AND WHAT TYPE OF 
CASE IT WAS. 
VENIREMAN C. ANDERSON: I BELIEVE IT WAS IN THE 
SUMMER OF 1994. IT WAS IN THIRD DISTRICT COURT, AND IT WAS A 
SEXUAL ABUSE CASE. 
THE COURT: WAS IT FOR THE PLAINTIFF OR THE 
DEFENDANT? 
VENIREMAN C. ANDERSON: IT WAS FOR THE 
PLAINTIFF. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
VENIREMAN GRAY: I'VE TESTIFIED IN NUMEROUS 
CASES OVER MY TWENTY-THREE YEAR CAREER, BOTH IN DISTRICT, 
FEDERAL AND CIRCUIT COURT. THEY'VE BEEN ALL TYPES OF CASES. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: IN '86 IT WAS A TRAFFIC 
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ACCIDENT INVOLVING MYSELF. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
VENIREMAN CARLESON: I WAS IN FEDERAL COURT IN 
THE MID 70'S. 
THE COURT: DID YOU TESTIFY FOR THE PLAINTIFF OR 
THE DEFENDANT? 
VENIREMAN CARLESON: FOR THE PLAINTIFF. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
VENIREMAN COOK: WOULD THAT INCLUDE 
DEPOSITIONS? 
THE COURT: YES. 
VENIREMAN COOK: I GUESS THEN IT WAS--I DON'T 
KNOW. 1 THINK IT WAS IN THE EARLY '80'S. 
THE COURT: NEXT? 
VENIREMAN JEX: IT WAS IN THE MID '80'S IN THIS 
COURT, A BREAKING AND ENTERING. 
THE COURT: WAS IT FOR THE STATE OR FOR THE 
DEFENSE? 
VENIREMAN JEX: FOR THE STATE. 
THE COURT: LET ME ASK THE ONES OF YOU WHO 
HAVE RESPONDED TO THIS QUESTION, THE FACT THAT YOU'VE HAD AN 
OPPORTUNITY TO TESTIFY IN COURT, WHETHER THAT WOULD 
PREJUDICE YOU IN ANY WAY SUCH THAT YOU COULD NOT LISTEN TO 
THE EVIDENCE OF THIS CASE AND GIVE THE STATE AND THE 
DEFENDANT A FAIR AND IMPARTIAL TRIAL. IF YOU COULD NOT DO SO, 
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PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT SEES NO 
HANDS. 
LET ME ALSO INDICATE TO YOU, MEMBERS OF THE 
JURY, AND ASK YOU, THAT AS THE CASE AND THE EVIDENCE IS 
PRESENTED TO YOU, YOU MUST LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE THAT COMES 
FORTH FROM THE WITNESSES FROM THE WITNESS STAND, AND BASED 
ON THAT EVIDENCE, AND THAT EVIDENCE ALONE-NOT ANYTHING THAT 
YOU MAY HAVE HEARD OUTSIDE THE COURTROOM--BUT BASED ON 
THAT EVIDENCE AND THE INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW THAT THE COURT 
GIVES YOU, YOU MUST BASE YOUR VERDICT. EACH INDIVIDUAL MUST 
DECIDE THE CASE FOR HIM OR HERSELF. 
YOU WILL DISCUSS IT WITH YOUR OTHER MEMBERS OF 
THE JURY AND SEE THEIR VIEWS AND OPINIONS, BUT YOU MUST 
ULTIMATELY DECIDE THE CASE ON YOUR OWN THE WAY YOU SEE IT 
AND VOTE ACCORDINGLY. 
MY QUESTION IS WHETHER THERE ARE ANY OF YOU 
WHO COULD NOT SIT AND LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE LISTEN TO THE 
INSTRUCTIONS ON THE LAW, AND MAKE A DECISION AS TO THE GUILT 
OR INNOCENCE OF ANOTHER INDIVIDUAL, THE DEFENDANT IN THIS 
CASE. 
IF ANY OF YOU COULD NOT DO THIS, PLEASE SO 
INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT SEES NO HANDS. 
NOW MEMBERS OF THE JURY, I HAVE BEEN ADVISED 
THAT ONE OF THE DEFENSES THAT IS GOING TO BE RAISED IN THIS CASE 
IS THE DEFENSE OF FREE AGENCY. YOU'RE OBLIGATED TO LISTEN TO 
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ALL THE DEFENSES THAT ARE RAISED, WHATEVER THEY MIGHT BE MY 
QUESTION TO YOU IS WHETHER ANY OF YOU ON THE PANEL WOULD 
NOT LISTEN AND PAY STRICT ATTENTION TO THE DEFENDANT, MR. 
SHREWSBURY, AS HE PRESENTS HIS DEFENSE ON FREE AGENCY. IF ANY 
OF YOU WOULD NOT GIVE HIM STRICT ATTENTION AND LISTEN TO THAT 
DEFENSE AND WEIGH IT ACCORDINGLY, IF ANY OF YOU COULD NOT DO 
THIS, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. THE COURT SEES 
NO HANDS. 
I WOULD ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY, IF 
ANY OF YOU HAVE ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL INFIRMITIES WHICH 
WOULD CREATE A VERY SEVERE HARDSHIP ON YOU OR MAKE IT 
PRACTICALLY IMPOSSIBLE FOR YOU TO SIT ON THIS JURY. IF ANY OF 
YOU DO HAVE ANY PHYSICAL OR MENTAL INFIRMITIES OF THAT SORT, 
PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: WITH THIS PREGNANCY IT'S 
HARD TO SIT, BUT THAT'S IT. 
THE COURT: HOW FAR ARE YOU ALONG? 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: SEVEN MONTHS. 
THE COURT: HOW LONG CAN YOU SIT BEFORE YOU 
BECOME UNCOMFORTABLE? 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: AN HOUR, AND THEN I NEED A 
BREAK TO WALK AROUND. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU HAD ANY COMPLICATIONS 
WITH THIS PREGNANCY? 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: A HERNIA, DIFFERENT 
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THINGS LIKE THAT, BUT IT COULD BE POSSIBLE, BUT IT WOULD BE 
HARD. 
THE COURT: IS THIS YOUR FIRST? 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: FIFTH. 
THE COURT: DID YOU HAVE COMPLICATIONS WITH 
THE OTHER FOUR? 
VENIREMAN DEFOREST: JUST BACK TROUBLE, THAT 
TYPE OF THING; NOTHING SERIOUS. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. LET ME ASK ALSO-AND I'M 
ASKING THESE QUESTIONS SO THE ATTORNEYS CAN MAKE NOTE OF 
THEM-LET ME ALSO ASK YOU, MEMBERS OF THE JURY-AND I CANT 
EXCUSE YOU FOR THIS, BUT I ASK THIS SO THAT THE ATTORNEYS CAN 
MAKE NOTE--WHETHER ANY OF YOU ARE IN A POSITION IN YOUR LIFE, 
YOUR PERSONAL LIFE, THAT IT WOULD WORK A VERY SEVERE 
HARDSHIP ON YOU TO SIT ON THIS JURY. 
I'M THINKING OF A SITUATION WHERE YOU MAY HAVE 
A SON OR DAUGHTER GETTING MARRIED TOMORROW MORNING, OR 
YOU'VE HAD A DEATH IN THE FAMILY AND THE FUNERAL IS SET FOR 
TOMORROW AT NOON OR SOMETHING OF THAT SORT, OR MAYBE YOU 
HAVE A SPECIAL BUSINESS TRIP YOU'VE PLANNED FOR THREE OR FOUR 
MONTHS OR A VACATION OR SOMETHING; ANYTHING OF THAT SORT. 
IF ANY OF YOU DO FIND YOURSELVES IN A SITUATION 
WHERE IT WOULD WORK A SEVERE HARDSHIP ON YOU IN HAVING TO 
SIT ON THIS JURY, PLEASE SO INDICATE BY RAISING YOUR HANDS. 
VENIREMAN D. ANDERSON: I CURRENTLY, YOUR 
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HONOR, HAVE A CASE BEFORE JUDGE STIRBA, AND I'M SET TO GO 
TOMORROW MORNING TO RHODE ISLAND TO PARTICIPATE IN 
DOCUMENT PRODUCTION AND THE TAKING OF DEPOSITIONS. THAT'S 
BEEN SCHEDULED FOR SOME WEEKS. IT'S THE ONLY TIME OPPOSING 
COUNSEL AND I HAVE HAD WHERE WE CAN ACCOMPLISH THAT TASK. 
I'LL BE THERE FOR FOUR DAYS. 
THE COURT: YOU SAY SOMETHING ABOUT JUDGE 
STIRBA AND SOMETHING BEFORE HER TODAY? 
VENIREMAN D. ANDERSON: NO, THE CASE IS BEFORE 
HER. 
THE COURT. I SEE. YOU'RE GOING ON THE 
DEPOSITION. I'M WITH YOU. MA'AM? 
VENIREMAN HORTON: DID YOU SAY FOR TOMORROW 
MORNING OR--. 
THE COURT: THE CASE WILL GO TODAY AND 
THROUGH TOMORROW. IT WILL BE A TWO-DAY CASE AS FAR AS WE 
CAN TELL RIGHT NOW. 
VENIREMAN HORTON: THEN THERE'S NO PROBLEM. 
VENIREMAN WEBB: MY BOSS IS OUT OF TOWN UNTIL 
WEDNESDAY, AND IT COULD BE WORKED THROUGH, BUT I'M THE ONE IN 
CHARGE OVER THERE. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. 
VENIREMAN C. ANDERSON: I ONLY HAVE CONCERNS 
ABOUT HOW LATE IN THE DAY THE CASE MAY GO. 
THE COURT: WE GENERALLY RECESS AT 5:00 O'CLOCK, 
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BUT THAT IS NOT SET. IF A WITNESS IS ON THE WITNESS STAND AND I 
THINK IT'S UNFAIR TO INTERRUPT A WITNESS, WE WOULD GO TO 5:15 OR 
5:30. SOMETIMES WE MAY QUIT AT QUARTER TO 5:00. IT MAY DEPEND. 
IT MAY BE THAT COME TUESDAY EVENING, YOU MAY BE 
DELIBERATING; IF THE CASE IS SUBMITTED TO YOU, I WOULD KEEP YOU 
HERE IN THE EVENING HOURS TO DELIBERATE. ANYBODY ELSE? 
VENIREMAN LINDLEY: IF IT MEANS NOT UNTIL 
THURSDAY, THURSDAY NIGHT, I'M LEAVING ON A BUSINESS TRIP WITH 
THE POWER COMPANY. 
THE COURT: WE PLAN TO BE THROUGH BY THAT TIME. 
DOES THE STATE HAVE ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS? 
MS. BYRNE: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DOES THE DEFENSE HAVE ANY FURTHER 
QUESTIONS? 
MR. SHREWSBURY: YES, YOUR HONOR. SHOULD I 
BRING THEM TO YOU? 
THE COURT: YOU CAN BRING THEM TO ME. 
MR. SHREWSBURY: THOSE, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: HAVE YOU SEEN THESE? 
MS. BYRNE: NO. 
THE COURT: APPROACH. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
HAD IN CAMERA, OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
MS. BYRNE: MOST OF THESE SEEM TO BE GETTING OFF 
INTO PHILOSOPHY. I THINK THIS QUESTION WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE. 
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"DO YOU BELIEVE THAT AN INDIVIDUAL MAY USE MARIJUANA?" I 
THINK THAT SEEMS INAPPROPRIATE. 
MR. SHREWSBURY: IN SOME CIRCUMSTANCES, LIKE--I 
THINK IF HE'S CONFRONTING--. 
THE COURT: THAT'S WHAT I WOULD INSTRUCT IN THE 
INSTRUCTIONS. IF AN OFFICER WAS VIOLATING THE LAW, THEN A 
PERSON WOULD HAVE A RIGHT TO THAT. 
MR. SHREWSBURY: AND I COULD GET A HIGHER CASE, 
I COULD GET-. 
THE COURT: BUT THAT'S NOT BEFORE THIS COURT. 
MS. BYRNE: AND I WOULD OBJECT TO THAT. 
MR SHREWSBURY: JUST TO SHOW CAUSE FOR IT. 
THE COURT: THIS NO. 49, I'M GOING TO READ IT FOR 
THE BENEFIT OF THE RECORD: 
DO YOU BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE TIMES WHICH 
MAY, UNDER CERTAIN CIRCUMSTANCES, 
WARRANT FLIGHT FROM AN OFFICER OF THE 
LAW? IS SO: UNDER WHAT POSSIBLE 
CIRCUMSTANCES? 
AND IF YOU HAVE AN INSTRUCTION THAT THE OFFICER WAS IN 
VIOLATION OF THE LAW, AND YOU WERE IN FEAR OF HIM, THEN THAT 
WOULD BE SOMETHING I WOULD INSTRUCT THE JURY ON, BUT IT'S NOT 
SOMETHING I WOULD DO HERE. 
NEXT YOU'VE ASKED, IN NO. 51: 
IF IN PRIVACY, AN INDIVIDUAL IS USING 
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MARIJUANA; DO YOU BELIEVE THAT ANY 
PERSON OR PERSONS ARE OFFENDED? IF SO, IN 
WHAT WAY? 
IT'S AGAINST THE LAW IN THE STATE OF UTAH TO USE MARIJUANA IN 
ANY WAY. THAT'S AN IMPROPER QUESTION. I DONT CARE IF IT'S 
OFFENSIVE, IT'S AGAINST THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
AND THE LAST ONE: 
DO YOU UNDERSTAND THE DIFFERENCE 
BETWEEN THE LETTER OF THE LAW AND THE 
SPIRIT OF THE LAW? IF SO, WHAT IS OF GREATER 
OF IMPORTANCE TO FOLLOW? 
I WOULD BE INSTRUCTING THEM ON THE LAW. THEY MUST FOLLOW 
THE LAW AS I SO INSTRUCT THEM; I DON'T CARE ABOUT THE LETTER OR 
THE SPIRIT, THE WAY YOU'VE PUT IT. I INSTRUCT THEM ON THE LAW 
AND THEY MUST FOLLOW THE LAW AS I SO INSTRUCT THEM. 
THEREFORE 1 WOULD DENY YOUR RIGHT TO ASK ANY OF THOSE THREE 
QUESTIONS. 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS 
CONTINUED IN OPEN COURT, IN THE PRESENCE AND 
HEARING OF JURY PANEL AND DEFENDANT:) 
THE COURT: DOES THE DEFENDANT HAVE ANY 
FURTHER QUESTIONS? 
MR. SHREWSBURY: NO, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: DO YOU BOTH THEN, SUBJECT TO THE 
DISCUSSION AT THE BENCH, PASS THE JURY FOR CAUSE? 
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1 MS. BYRNE: THE STATE PASSES THE JURY FOR CAUSE, 
2 YOUR HONOR. 
3 MR. STEELE: YOUR HONOR, WE WOULD LIKE TO 
4 APPROACH THE BENCH. 
5 (WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS WERE 
6 HAD IN CAMERA, OUT OF THE HEARING OF THE JURY:) 
7 MR. STEELE: I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO EXCUSE NO. 
8 1, DAVID ANDERSON, BECAUSE HE NEEDS TO BE WHERE HE NEEDS TO 
9 BE TOMORROW. ON NO. 9,1 WOULD ALSO ASK THE COURT TO EXCUSE 
10| THAT JUROR FOR CAUSE. NO. 7 IS THE CHIEF OF POLICE, AND THERE'S 
11 JUST FAR TOO MUCH INFORMATION AND KNOWLEDGE THAT WOULD GO 
12 INTO THE JURY ROOM. AND I KNOW HE WOULD TRY TO BE FAIR, BUT 
13 THERE WOULD JUST BE TOO MUCH. ANYTHING YOU OBJECT TO0 
14 AND THEN ALSO WE'RE OBJECTING TO THIS ONE. 
15 THOSE ARE THE THREE THAT--. 
161| MS. BYRNE: WE'RE TALKING ABOUT NO. 1 AND NO. 7 
171 AND NO. 9? I DON'T SEE ANY REASON TO EXCUSE NO. 9 FOR CAUSE. I 
18 THINK NO. 1,1 DON'T HAVE ANY OBJECTION TO EXCUSING NO. 1. NO. 7, I 
19 THINK I WOULD HAVE AN OBJECTION TO. 
20 THE COURT: YOU'RE OBJECTING TO THE EXCUSING OF 
21 NO. 9? 
22 MR. STEELE: THE PREGNANT WOMAN. 
23 THE COURT: THE COURT WOULD-MARK, HAND ME 
24 THE JURY LIST. BASED ON THE STIPULATION, THIS COURT WOULD 
251 EXCUSE NO. 1, AND NO. 7 BASED ON THE STATE'S STIPULATION. AND 
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THE COURT WILL GRANT THE MOTION TO DISMISS NO 9 I DON'T WANT 
TO HAVE ANY TYPE OF MISCARRIAGE OR SOMETHING GOING ON IN THE 
COURTROOM SO BASED ON THAT, DO YOU BOTH PASS THE JURY FOR 
CAUSE9 
MR STEELE. YES 
MS BYRNE YES 
(WHEREUPON, THE FOLLOWING PROCEEDINGS 
CONTINUED IN OPEN COURT, IN THE PRESENCE AND 
HEARING JURY PANEL AND DEFENDANT ) 
THE COURT MR FULLMER9 MEMBERS OF THE JURY, 
AT THIS TIME COUNSEL HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO SELECT THE JURY 
AS THEY SEE FIT ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THEY HAVE CERTAIN RIGHTS TO MAKE CERTAIN PEREMPTORY 
CHALLENGES AS WE CALL THEM TO CERTAIN JURORS BASED ON THE 
INFORMATION THEY HAVE HEARD HERE TODAY 
I WOULD LIKE TO TAKE THIS TIME TO EXPLAIN TO YOU 
WHAT YOUR RESPONSIBILITY IS AS A JUROR, WHAT MY RESPONSIBILITY 
IS AS THE COURT--AND I REFER TO MYSELF AS "THE COURT"--AND WHAT 
THE ATTORNEYS' RESPONSIBILITY IS, AND THEN ALSO EXPLAIN TO YOU 
HOW A CASE IS TRIED IN A COURT OF LAW. 
FIRST OF ALL, YOUR RESPONSIBILITY AS A JUROR IS TO 
LISTEN TO THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED FROM THE WITNESSES FROM THE 
WITNESS STAND HERE IN THIS COURTROOM, AND FROM THAT 
TESTIMONY YOU MUST BASE YOUR DECISION 




CLOSING ARGUMENT BY SHREWSBURY 
ill CLOSING ARGUMENT 
2
 BY MR SHREWSBURY-
3 WELL, RATHER THAN GOING RIGHT INTO THE 
4 PARTICULAR OFFENSES THAT WERE CHARGED, I WOULD LIKE TO MAKE 
5 A RECURRENCE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS. I'D LIKE TO START OUT BY 
6 READING WHAT I HAVE PREPARED CALLED A DOCTRINE OF FREE 
7 AGENCY THESIS AND GO AHEAD AND READ IT. I'LL DO IT THAT WAY. 
8 THIS IS DESIRABLE TO HAVE FAITH AND HOPE IN THAT 
9 WHICH IS TRUE. TO HAVE FAITH IS TO BELIEVE WITH CONFIDENCE AND 
10 REQUIRES A LOYALTY FOR OUR BELIEFS. LOYALTY TO ONE'S FAITH, 
!
 1 HOWEVER STRONG, MUST NEEDS BE EXHIBITED WITH HUMILITY, 
12 ACCEDING TO THE FACT THAT TO BELIEVE IS ALSO AN ADMISSION OF 
13 LACK OF KNOWLEDGE 
14 TO ALLOW ONE'S SELF TO BECOME VEHEMENT TO 
15 LOYALTY TO ONE'S FAITH IS TO EXHIBIT MATURITY. 
16 THE ELEMENTS OF BELIEF WHICH CAUSE ONE TO HAVE 
17 FAITH ARE IN NO WAY AS IMPORTANT AS THE RESULT THEREOF. 
18 IT IS IMPORTANT THAT ONE'S FAITH PROVIDE THEM 
19 WITH MORAL CAUSE TO STRIVE FOR THAT WHICH IS GOOD. ISSUES OF 
20 MORALITY ARE FAR TOO CONTROVERSIAL. EVERY ONE KNOWS WHAT 
21 IS RIGHT AND WRONG. DESPITE ALL DOCTRINES, THERE IS BUT ONE 
22 ESSENTIAL FOR PEACEFUL EXISTENCE OF MANKIND ONE WITH 
23 ANOTHER: THE DOCTRINE OF FREE AGENCY. 
24 FREE AGENCY IS THE ABILITY TO MAKE OUR OWN 
25|| DECISIONS AND THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO DO SO. INTENT IS A TRUE 
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1 MEASURE OF HEALING. TO DEFEND A RIGHT IS CAUSED FROM 
2 RIGHTEOUS INTENT. TO DEFEND AN UNRIGHTEOUS CAUSE COMES FROM 
3 UNRIGHTEOUS INTENT. 
4 OFFENSIVE OR TYPE B AS IN BOY AGENCY CONSISTS 
5 OF ALL CHOICES MADE WHICH RESULT IN OFFENSIVE ACTIONS TAKEN 
6 TO INFRINGE UPON FREE AGENCY OF OTHERS. THIS IS THAT AREA OF 
7 FREE AGENCY CHOICES WHICH ARE, BY NATURE, UNLAWFUL. IT IS 
8 UNIVERSALLY AGREEABLE AS THAT AREA OF FREE AGENCY CHOICE 
9 WHICH WE HAVE A RIGHT AND RESPONSIBILITY TO DEFEND OURSELVES 
10| AGAINST. 
11 I NON-OFFENSIVE OR TYPE A FREE AGENCY CONSISTS 
12 OF ALL CHOICES MADE WHICH DO NOT RESULT IN OFFENSIVE ACTION 
13 TAKEN TO INFRINGE UPON THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS. 
14 THESE AREAS OF FREE AGENCY CHOICE ARE BY 
15 NATURE UNLAWFUL AND CONSIST OF FOUR DIFFERENT TYPES OF 
16 CHOICE: CHARITY, WHICH BENEFITS OTHERS; PROGRESSIVE, WHICH ARE 
17 CHOICES WHICH DIRECTLY BENEFIT ONE'S SELF; REDRESSIVE WHICH 
18 CONSISTS OF CHOICES WHICH REMIT TO ONE'S SELF; AND DEFENSIVE 
19 CHOICES, MADE TO PREVENT INFRINGEMENT UPON ONE'S FREE AGENCY 
20 TO DEFEND AN EXCESS TO OFFEND. 
21 OFFENSIVE DEFENSE SHOULD BE DONE WITH LOVE. 
22 ATTEMPTS TO CONTROL TYPE A FREE AGENCY CHOICES ARE OF AN 
23 OFFENSIVE NATURE. TYPE A FREE AGENCY IS AN INHERENT PART OF 
24 LIFE AND PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. 
251 ALL FREE AGENCY CHOICES HAVE AN INDIRECT 
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ill EFFECT ON SOCIETY, BE THEY OFFENSIVE OR DEFENSIVE. 
2 ALL OFFENSIVE TYPE B FREE AGENCY CHOICES HAVE 
3 DIRECT EFFECTS ON SOCIETY. NON-OFFENSIVE OR TYPE A FREE 
4 AGENCY CHOICES HAVE AN OCCASIONAL DIRECT EFFECT ON SOCIETY. 
5 THEY ARE, HOWEVER, OF NON-OFFENSIVE INTENT AND ARE 
6 ACCIDENTAL OR MURPHY'S LAW. 
7 THERE IS MADE NO ATTEMPT HERE TO DICTATE, TO 
8 PERSUADE OR ARGUE THE ISSUE OR MORALITY, ONLY TO POINT OUT 
9 THAT CONTROVERSIAL MORAL ISSUES ARE NOT OFFENSIVE OR TYPE A 
10 FREE AGENCY INSOFAR AS THEY DO NOT RESULT IN OFFENSIVE 
11 ACTIONS TO INFRINGE UPON FREE AGENCY OF OTHERS. 
12 LOVE AS A WORD IS AN INDICATION OF AFFECTION 
13 WHICH LEADS TO RESPONSIBILITY OF INTERPRETATION TO THE 
14 RECIPIENT. CONTROVERSIAL MORAL ISSUES ARE SIMILAR IN THAT 
15 THEY MEAN DIFFERENT THINGS TO DIFFERENT PEOPLE. 
16 IN SOME THEY INSIGHT FEAR, ANXIETY, 
17 DEMORALIZATION OF MANKIND; IN OTHERS, FREEDOM, ENJOYMENT, 
18 ESCAPE FROM DAILY TURMOIL, AND UNEQUIVOCATION OF MANKIND. 
19 WHEN ONE'S ACTIONS ARE NON-OFFENSIVE IN INTENT, 
20 THE RESULT THEREOF INFRINGES UPON THE FREE AGENCY OF NO ONE. 
21 THERE IS NO DEFENSE WARRANTED, FOR WHEREIN LIES THE CAUSE? 
22 WE MAY ABHOR ONE'S MORALITY, YET WE CANNOT 
23 DICTATE THAT MORALITY WITHOUT BECOMING OFFENSIVE. 
24 TO JUDGE THE MORALITY OF OTHERS IS NOT OUR 
25|| TASK. ATTEMPTS TO ANALYZE THE POSSIBLE DIRECT EFFECT ON 
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1 SOCIETY-I'M SORRY, THE DIRECT EFFECT OF NON-OFFENSIVE TYPE A 
2 FREE AGENCY CHOICES ON SOCIETY LEAVES US WITH ONLY A VAGUE 
3 IDEA AS TO WHAT THOSE EFFECTS MAY BE. 
4 SO WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE EFFECTS OF SAY 
5 ABORTION OR SUICIDE OR FIREARMS OR HOMOSEXUALITY OR DRUGS 
6 ON SOCIETY? AMD THINKING ABOUT THOSE, IT'S HARD FOR ME TO 
7 I PINPOINT WHAT THOSE EFFECTS MAY BE. 
8 WE MAY REGARD THESE THINGS WITH HORROR AND 
9 DISGUST, YET INSOFAR AS THOSE CHOICES RESULT IN NON-OFFENSIVE 
10II ACTIONS TAKEN TO INFRINGE UPON OUR FREE AGENCY, WE CAN 
111| TRUTHFULLY CLAIM NO CAUSE 
12 YET, FOR WHATEVER PRETENTION, GRIEVOUS LAWS 
131 HAVE BEEN ENACTED, CONTRARY TO CIVIL AND CONSTITUTIONAL 
14l| RIGHTS, THE CAUSE OF WHICH ATTEMPTS TO INFRINGE UPON OUR 
1511 RIGHTS TO CONSCIENCE IN DICTATING OUR FREE EXERCISE OF TYPE A 
16 FREE AGENCY CHOICES, THE REALITY OF WHICH CONTRIBUTE FAR 
17 I MORE INHERENT PROBLEMS TO SOCIETY THAN WHATEVER CAUSED 
18 THEMSELVES AS A RESULT OF THE FREE EXERCISE OF CHOICE; TO WIT, 
19 A CAUSE OF FINANCIAL BURDENS ON SOCIETY AND BUSINESS, ON 
20 INDIVIDUALS, TO THE CAUSE OF INCARCERATION AND PUBLIC 
21 ASSISTANCE. 
22 IT RESULTS IN LOSS OF JOBS, HOMES, AUTOMOBILES 
23 AND OTHER TANGIBLES. IT DETERIORATES OUR FAMILY UNITS, 
24 CAUSING INSECURITIES AND SEPARATION, AND MORE OFTENTIMES 
25 J RESULTING IN DIVORCE. 
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ill IT DIMINISHES MENTAL HEALTH. IT CAUSES BROKEN 
2 HEARTS AND SPIRITS. IT CREATES CRIMINAL VENDETTAS WHICH ARE 
3 FORMED WHICH USUALLY MANIFEST THEMSELVES AS MORE CRIME. 
4 THE ATTITUDES OF PARENTS BECOME REFLECTED IN 
5 CHILDREN. IT DIMINISHES ALLEGIANCE TO ONE'S COUNTRY. 
6 ULTIMATELY IT RESULTS IN FAR MORE HARM TO SOCIETY THAN WHAT 
7 THE RESULTS OF TYPE A FREE AGENCY CHOICES ARE. 
8 TYPE A FREE AGENCY CHOICES ARE THE PURSUIT OF 
9 HAPPINESS AND ARE RELEVANT TO LIFE, WHICH HAPPENS TO EVERYONE 
10 IN RELATION TO THEIR PROSPECTIVE ENVIRONMENT, THUS MAKING 
1 THOSE CHOICES INHERENT; OF WHICH OUR GOVERNMENT IS BOUND. OR 
12 SHOULD BE BOUND, TO SUSTAIN AND UPHOLD. 
13 THAT THESE RIGHTS ARE SUSTAINED AND UPHELD IS 
14 OUR MOST PRIMARY PURPOSE: TO FORM, SUSTAIN AND UPHOLD THE 
15 GOVERNMENT. 
16 WE CANNOT ALLOW TYPE A FREE AGENCY CHOICE TO 
17 BE USED AS AN EXCUSE FOR THE COMMISSION OF A TYPE B FREE 
18 AGENCY OFFENSE. NEITHER CAN WE BLAME THOSE CHOICES FOR 
19 CHANGE OF INTENT. 
20 DO WE FEAR OUR INABILITY TO TEACH OUR CHILDREN 
21 THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN RIGHT AND WRONG, ACCORDING TO OUR 
22 OWN MORALITY, INSOFAR AS WE MUST PERSECUTE THOSE WHO 
23 BELIEVE DIFFERENTLY? 
24 YOU CAN BELIEVE IN PEOPLE; YOU JUST SHOULD. ONE 
251 CANNOT LEARN TO BE TRUSTWORTHY IF ONE IS TRUSTED. IF WE ARE 
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1 TO HAVE FAITH IN OUR GOVERNMENT, OUR GOVERNMENT MUST HAVE 
2 FAITH IN US. 
3 IN THAT AREA OF FAITH, WE MUST NOT BE DENIED 
4 OUR NON-OFFENSIVE, INALIENABLE RIGHTS TO THE FREE EXERCISE OF 
5 TYPE A FREE AGENCY. 
6 WE SHOULD NOT JUDGE THE MORALITY OF OTHERS. 
7 WE MUST HAVE FAITH AND HOPE IN THE ABILITY OF OUR FAMILY UNITS 
8 TO TEACH OUR CHILDREN STRONG MORAL CODES OF ETHICS. THE 
9 SINGLE MOST EDUCATIONAL INFLUENCE ON OUR CHILDREN IS THE 
10 EXAMPLE OF THEIR PARENTS. LIKEWISE, THE SINGLE MOST 
11 EDUCATIONAL INFLUENCE ON SOCIETY IS THE EXAMPLE OF OUR 
12 GOVERNMENT. 
13 AS A SOCIETY AND AS INDIVIDUALS-I'M SORRY, I 
14 MISSED A LINE. EXCUSE ME. IF WE ARE TO TEACH NON-OFFENSIVE 
15 BEHAVIOR, WE MUST SET A NON-OFFENSIVE EXAMPLE, AS A SOCIETY 
16 AND AS INDIVIDUALS. 
17 EACH AND EVERY ONE OF US MUST ACKNOWLEDGE 
18 AND ACCEPT THE EXISTENCE OF EACH OTHER'S INALIENABLE FREE 
19 AGENCY, REACTING ONLY IN DEFENSE OF OUR OWN AND FOR THOSE TO 
20 WHOM WE HAVE RESPONSIBILITY, AND NEVER IN OFFENSE TO OTHERS. 
21 WE HAVE AN INALIENABLE RIGHT TO OUR OWN 
22 BELIEFS AND TO OUR OWN SENSE OF MORALITY. IF WE ARE TO BE 
23 MASTERS OF OUR OWN DESTINY, THEN WE MUST MAINTAIN OUR FREE 
24 AGENCY. 
25|| THE LAW IS THAT WHICH CAN BE BOLDLY ASSERTED 
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ill AND POSITIVELY MAINTAINED. 
21 TO SHOW THAT THESE ARE NOT JUST MY ORIGINAL 
3 IDEAS, BEING NEW, FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS, I'M GOING TO REFER TO THE 
4 DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS. SECTION 134, WHEREIN, VERSE 1, IT 
5 STATES: 
61 WE BELIEVE THAT GOVERNMENTS WERE 
7 INSTITUTED OF GOD FOR THE BENEFIT OF MAN; 
8 AND THAT HE HOLDS MAN ACCOUNTABLE FOR 
9 THEIR ACTS IN RELATION TO THEM, BOTH IN 
10 MAKING LAWS AND ADMINISTERING THEM, FOR 
11 THE GOOD AND SAFETY OF SOCIETY. 
12 1 ASSERT THAT LAWS WHICH LIMIT FREE AGENCY ARE NOT FOR THE 
13 GOOD AND SAFETY OF SOCIETY, AS THEY DO MORE HARM THAN WOULD 
14 PREVAIL. VERSE 2: 
15 WE BELIEVE THAT NO GOVERNMENT CAN EXIST 
16 IN PEACE, EXCEPT SUCH LAWS ARE FRAMED AND 
17 HELD INVIOLATE AS WILL SECURE TO EACH 
18 INDIVIDUAL THE FREE EXERCISE OF 
19 CONSCIENCE, THE RIGHT AND CONTROL OF 
20 PROPERTY, AND THE PROTECTION OF LIFE. 
21 FREE EXERCISE OF CONSCIENCE, I BELIEVE, IS LOGICALLY VIABLE AS IS 
22 TYPE A FREE AGENCY, AS OUTLINED IN THE DOCTRINE OF FREE AGENCY 
23 THESIS. 
24 FOR PURPOSES HERE, I'M GOING TO SKIP THE NEXT 
251 VERSE AND GO TO VERSE 4: 
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1 WE BELIEVE THAT RELIGION IS INSTITUTED OF 
2 GOD; AND THAT MEN ARE AMENABLE TO HIM, 
3 AND TO HIM ONLY, FOR THE EXERCISE OF IT, 
4 UNLESS THEIR RELIGIOUS OPINIONS PROMPT 
5 THEM TO INFRINGE UPON THE RIGHTS AND 
4 LIBERTIES OF OTHERS; BUT WE DO NOT BELIEVE 
7 THAT HUMAN LAW HAS A RIGHT TO INTERFERE 
8 IN PRESCRIBING RULES OF WORSHIP TO BIND 
9 THE CONSCIENCE'S OF MEN, NOR DICTATE FORMS 
10 FOR PUBLIC OR PRIVATE DEVOTION; THAT THE 
11 CIVIL MAGISTRATE SHOULD RESTRAIN CRIME, 
12 BUT NEVER CONTROL CONSCIENCE; SHOULD 
13 PUNISH GUILT, BUT NEVER SUPPRESS THE 
14 FREEDOM OF THE SOUL. 
15 TYPE A FREE AGENCY CHOICES DO NOT PROMPT ONE TO INFRINGE UPON 
16 THE RIGHTS OR LIBERTIES OF OTHERS. ON TO VERSE 5: 
17 WE BELIEVE THAT ALL MEN ARE BOUND TO 
18 SUSTAIN AND UPHOLD THE RESPECTIVE 
19 GOVERNMENTS IN WHICH THEY RESIDE, WHILE 
20 PROTECTED IN THEIR INHERENT AND 
21 INALIENABLE RIGHTS BY THE LAWS OF SUCH 
22 GOVERNMENTS; AND THAT SEDITION AND 
23 REBELLION ARE UNBECOMING EVERY CITIZEN 
24 THUS PROTECTED... 
251 THAT PRETTY MUCH SUMS UP THAT SECTION, WHAT I WANTED TO 
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ill INDICATE. 
2 I'LL MOVE ON TO THE CHARGES AT HAND. THE 
3 DEFENDANT PLEADS TO THE JURY AT THIS TIME AS TO COUNT NO. I, 
4 FAILURE TO RESPOND TO AN OFFICER'S SIGNAL TO STOP, THAT WHILE 
5 THE TESTIMONY WAS GIVEN BY THE DEFENDANT CONCERNING INTENT 
6 AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, MAINTAINING THAT THE-THAT HE WAS 
7 DEFENDING HIS LIBERTY PURSUANT TO SECTION 1, ARTICLE 1 OF THE 
8 UTAH CONSTITUTION, AND THAT THE INCIDENT WAS NOT WITH 
9 WANTON DISREGARD OF SAFETY; REMINDING THE COURT THAT THERE 
10 WAS NO PHYSICAL HARM DONE TO PERSONS AND MINIMAL DAMAGE TO 
11 PROPERTY. 
12 ACKNOWLEDGING THAT WITHOUT SUPPORTIVE 
13 EVIDENCE AS TO EVENTS LEADING UP TO THE INCIDENT, IN AN EFFORT 
14 TO SHOW CAUSE FOR INTENT AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE 
15 DEFENDANT WILL CONCEDE WITHOUT MALICE TO WHATEVER VERDICT 
16 THE JURY MAY DEEM AS EQUITABLE. 
17 YET WHO BETTER THAN THE DEFENDANT CAN ATTEST 
18 TO INTENT? 
19 AS TO COUNT NO. II, UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A 
20 CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE WITH INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE, THE DEFENSE 
21 MAINTAINS THAT THERE IS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO PROVE BEYOND 
22 A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THERE WAS POSSESSION WITH INTENT TO 
23 DISTRIBUTE, AND REMINDS THE COURT THAT THERE IS SHAKY 
24 TESTIMONY PERTAINING TO SEIZURE OF SAID EVIDENCE BY TROOPER 
251 TURNER, CONTAINING CONTRADICTIONS, THAT THERE IS 
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1 CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE PERTAINING TO THAT SAME TESTIMONY-
2 I'M SORRY, I'M GOING TO STRIKE THAT PART. AND THAT PART HAS 
3 REFERENCE TO THE FINDING OF CAUSE AND WAS NOT PRESENTED AS 
4 EVIDENCE, SO I MAY NOT USE THAT. 
5 HOWEVER, TROOPER TURNER DID WRITE IN HIS 
6 REPORT THAT THERE WAS TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY-SEVEN DOLLARS 
7 FIFTEEN CENTS FROM THE DEFENDANT'S POCKET, AND LATER HE 
8 CLAIMED IT WAS FOUND IN THE DEFENDANT'S FANNY PACK. 
9 THE DEFENDANT HAS GIVEN TESTIMONY AS TO THE 
10 FACT THAT THEY DID NOT SEIZE THE FANNY PACK OR POCKET AS HE 
11 CLAIMS, AND THAT THE MARIJUANA IN EVIDENCE APPEARED DIFFERENT 
12,i THAN THAT WHICH WAS SEIZED; CONCEDING AT THIS TIME THAT THAT 
131 DIFFERENCE, IT MAY BE CAUSED DUE TO FERMENTATION OR 
14 SOMETHING, BUT IT DEFINITELY LOOKS DIFFERENT THAN THAT WHICH 
15 I WAS SEIZED AS WELL. 
16 THE USE OF THE SCALE AS A MEASURING DEVICE OF 
17 MARIJUANA IS EXTENSIVE AND OFTENTIMES YOU RECEIVE IT PACKED 
18 AND YOU CHECK THE WEIGHT OF THOSE OUNCES, AND IT'S ESSENTIAL 
19 TO HAVE IT IN OUNCES IN ORDER FOR IT TO BE ACCURATE. 
20 IF YOU WEIGH THAT AMOUNT OF MARIJUANA IN ONE 
21 PACKAGE ON A SCALE OF THAT NATURE, IT WOULD BE INACCURATE. 
22 THE DEFENSE PLEADS WITH THE JURY TO FIND A 
23 RULING OF NOT GUILTY BASED NOT ONLY ON INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE, 
24 BUT MUCH MORE IMPORTANTLY, BASED ON SECTION NOS. 1 AND 4, 
251 ARTICLE 1 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION; AND EVEN MORE 
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ill IMPORTANTLY, BASED ON THE UTAH CONSTITUTION--OR, ON THE US 
21 CONSTITUTION, PURSUANT TO OUR RIGHTS TO PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS. 
3 THE DEFENDANT PRAYS THAT YOU WILL RECOGNIZE 
4 THE NEED TO UPHOLD THESE CONSTITUTIONS AND CREATE A MEANS 
5 WHEREBY OUR SOCIETY MAY RETURN TO FREEDOMS THEREIN. 
6 ON COUNT NO. Ill, ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER, THE 
7 DEFENSE MAINTAINS THAT THERE'S INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
8 CONCLUDE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THERE WAS AN 
9 ASSAULT, THAT THERE IS CONTRADICTORY EVIDENCE GIVEN BY 
10 OFFICER JAMES WRIGHT WHEREIN, DURING THE PRELIMINARY HEARING, 
11 HE ATTESTED THAT HE PLACED HIS LEFT HAND ON THE DEFENDANT'S 
12 RIGHT HANDS WHILE THEY WERE UP IN THE AIR, AND THAT HE WAS 
13 GOING TO STEP BEHIND HIM TO PUT HIM IN A WRIST LOCK. 
14 AND THEN DURING THE TRIAL, HE CLAIMED THAT HE 
15 PLACED THAT--HE GRABBED THE DEFENDANTS LEFT HAND, CHANGING 
16 THE HANDS--A CLAIM OF VARIOUS HANDS-CHANGING THAT ON HIM. 
17 THAT INCIDENT REPORT FROM OFFICER GAVTN COOK 
18 HAS MADE NO MENTION OF HAVING WITNESSED AN ASSAULT. 
19 THAT TESTIMONY FROM GAVIN COOK STATED THAT 
20 HE SAW THE DEFENDANT TURN, LEAN, AND ONLY BRIEFLY FOR A 
21 SECOND MAKE CONTACT WITH OFFICER JAMES WRIGHT. WITHIN THAT 
22 AMOUNT OF TIME, THERE IS NO POSSIBLE WAY THAT OFFICER WRIGHT 
23 COULD WALK UP TO THE DEFENDANT, GRAB HIS HAND IN AN EFFORT TO 
24 PUT HIM IN A CONTROL HOLD, AND THEN HAVE THE WITNESS HAVING 
25 J STOPPED FULLY, PUT HIS ARMS IN THE AIR, BROUGHT HIM DOWN AND 
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1 MADE A MOTION LIKE THAT. 
2 BUT RATHER, AS BOTH THE DEFENDANT AND OFFICER 
3 GAVIN COOK HAVE STATED, THAT IT WAS JUST A BRIEF ENCOUNTER, 
4 WHEREAS THE DEFENDANTS BODY TURNED SLIGHTLY AND WAS 
5 IMMEDIATELY AWAY FROM JAMES WRIGHT, THAT THE ACTION WHICH 
6 HE WITNESSED WAS ONE OF A FLEEING NATURE WHEREIN THE 
7 DEFENDANT'S BODY TURNED ONLY SLIGHTLY AFTER MAKING CONTACT. 
8 THE DEFENDANT HAS TESTIFIED THAT HE RAN 
9 TOWARDS OFFICER WRIGHT. HE TRIED TO PASS TO THE SIDE OF 
10 OFFICER WRIGHT AND PUT HIS ARM OUT IN A HORIZONTAL POSITION IN 
11 FRONT OF THE DEFENDANT, WHO WAS SLOWED BRIEFLY BY OFFICERS 
12 TO RESTRAIN HIM, CAUSING HIS BODY TO PIVOT SLIGHTLY; AND 
13 HAVING UNSUCCESSFULLY CONTINUED, CONTINUED PAST OFFICER 
14 WRIGHT. 
15 FURTHERMORE, THERE IS NO PHYSICAL EVIDENCE TO 
16 SUBSTANTIATE THE OFFICER'S CLAIM. THE DEFENDANT PLEADS A 
17 CHARGE OF NOT GUILTY TO BE FOUND TO THE COUNT OF ASSAULT ON 
18 AN OFFICER. 
19 AS TO COUNT NO. IV, FALSE IDENTITY TO A POLICE 
20 OFFICER, THE DEFENDANT WOULD LIKE TO INCLUDE THAT WITH THIS 
21 SECOND COUNT, COUNT NO. II, THAT THIS-JUST CONCLUDE THAT 
22 LIKEWISE THE SAME AS YOU WOULD WITH COUNT NO. II. THAT'S 
23 PRETTY MUCH WHAT I HAVE TO SAY. THANK YOU. 
24 REBUTTAL ARGUMENT 
251 BY MS. BYRNE: 
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ADDENDUM D 
INSTRUCTION NO. 
The Defendant has asserted that he had acted as he has rightfully based upon his belief 
in a concept he calls "free agency". The Court will not instruct you either way on the legal 
sufficiency of this as a defense to the present charges. The Court merely allows the Defendant 
this last opportunity to state this belief as follows: 
That free-agency is the ability to make one's own decisions, and the inalienable right 
to do so. 
That all choices made which result in offensive action taken to infringe upon the free-
agency of others is wrong and is that area of free-agency choice which we have a right and 
responsibility to defend ourselves against. 
That all choices made which do not result in offensive action taken to infringe upon the 
free-agency of others, are not within our right to attempt to control, as we cannot do so without 
being offensive and in thus trying, we not only fail, but we create many more problems as a 
result thereof. 
Furthermore, all choices are in fact inherent, be they offensive or defensive, we must 
maintain our free-agency with defence when we are offended. As well we must refrain from 
offending. 
That there are in fact issues of morality which must be allowed as they are non-offensive 
toward others, as well as controversial, they are choices made in the pursuit of happiness. 
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CHAIN OF CUSTODY STATEMENT RE: Chain of Custody 
The itemfs) submitted under the police aaency case numbers referenced 
in this report were in a sealed condition at the time any examination, 
testing or analysis was commenced by the undersigned, and that said 
examination or handling, if any, of the actual items within any such 
sealed containers was accomplished in a manner to preserve the integrity 
of the item to assure that any chance of misidentification. or 
environmental or cross-contamination would be avoided by adherence to 
standardized procedures within the Utah State Crime Laboratory appropriat 
to any processes applicable to the examination, analysis or testing of 
said items. Any deviation from said procedures, and reasons therefore 
is noted below. The breaking of an^ seal or part of the container in 
which the item was submitted- has been followed by a rteinsertion of 
the item into its original container, following any examination, testing 
or analysis and resealing of that container with the undersigned's 
initials placed over such new seal. 
Criminalistic Analysis Report Follows 
^ i H i L ur • J i R n 
2/01/95 CRIME LABORATORY REPORT ^AGE 
Q
:2^:16 4501 SOUTH 2~00 WEf>T 
SALT LAKE CITY. J7AH 3411* 
1 801 • <-c5-448" 
CL Case #: S Q5C039 Submitted Dare: 1/04/^5 
Submitted By: MARTIN TURNER Phone: 9e>54 
Agencv Code/No.: UHP UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 04Q4 110e>7 
Delivered By: ROB HUMPHREY Phone: 
Received By: SPJUT Phone: 
Suspect Last Name First Name Middle Name DOB Gender 
SHREWSBURY KENNETH NOLAN 7/05/o3 
CRIMINALISTIC ANALYSIS REPORT 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE 
1. Crushed marijuana was iaentified in each of the three plastic bags. 
The total weight of the plant material was 71.4 grams. 
N?-6nnifer M. Anaus 
Criminalist 
ADDENDUM G 
1 TALK TO MY CLIENT TO DO THINGS, I'M USED TO DOING IT MYSELF--BUT 
2 I BELIEVE THERE'S INSUFFICIENT CHAIN ESTABLISHED IN THAT WE 
3 HAVEN'T GOTTEN THE EVIDENCE FROM THE UTAH HIGHWAY PATROL 
4 DOWN TO THE CRIME LAB. THEY ALSO ACCEPTED BY SOMEONE ELSE 
5 DOWN AT THE CRIME LAB, OTHER THAN THE PERSON WHO TESTIFIED, 
6 THE MATERIALS. 
7 AND ON TO COUNT NO. Ill, THERE'S INSUFFICIENT 
8 EVIDENCE OF ASSAULT. WHAT WE HAVE IS EVIDENCE OF RESISTING 
9 ARREST, PRETTY CLEARLY ARREST, AND UNDER THE SHAUNDELL 
10 (PHONETIC) CASE, THAT'S A CLASS "B AS IN BOY," AND I WOULD ASK 
11 THE COURT TO DISMISS COUNT III BASED ON THE SHAUNDELL 
12 ARGUMENT AND INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE. 
13 MS. BYRNE: YOUR HONOR, THERE ARE TWO 
14 WITNESSES, BOTH OF WHOM HAVE BEEN TO THE PEACE OFFICER 
15 STANDARDS AND TRAINING, AND ONE TROOPER INDICATED HE HAD 
16 BEEN ON THE HIGHWAY FOR SEVENTEEN YEARS. HE HAS RECEIVED 
17 TRAINING, RECEIVED TRAINING WHILE HE WAS AT P.O.S.T., AS DID THE 
18 OTHER OFFICER, AND BOTH OF THEM TESTIFIED THAT, BASED ON THEIR 
19 TRAINING AND EXPERIENCE, THAT THE QUANTITY OF MARIJUANA, 
20 COUPLED PARTICULARLY WITH THE FACT THAT THERE WAS A SCALE, 
21 INDICATED TO THEM AN INTENT TO DISTRIBUTE. 
22 SO THERE'S CERTAINLY TESTIMONY THERE. THERE 
23 CERTAINLY ARE PEOPLE WHO IN A POSITION TO KNOW BECAUSE OF 
24 THEIR EXPERIENCE OUT AND ABOUT THE COMMUNITY, AND BECAUSE 
251 OF THEIR PREVIOUS TRAINING. 
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1 AS FAR AS THE CHAIN GOES, YOUR HONOR, EACH 
2 PERSON TESTIFIED THAT THE MARIJUANA AT THE PRESENT TIME IS IN 
3 THE SAME CONDITION AS IT WAS WHEN THEY LAST SAW IT. THE CASE 
4 LAW INDICATES THAT ONCE THE CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE HAS BEEN 
5 TAKEN TO EVIDENCE, THERE'S A PRESUMPTION OF REGULARITY IN THE 
6 CARE AND TRANSPORTATION OF THAT EVIDENCE. 
7 TROOPER TURNER SAID IT WAS IN THE SAME 
8 CONDITION AS WHEN HE OBTAINED FROM MR. SHREWSBURY'S FANNY 
9 PACK. HE INDICATED HE THEN TOOK IT TO EVIDENCE. 
10 THE CRIMINALIST INDICATED THAT IT'S NOW IN THE 
11 SAME CONDITION AS IT WAS WHEN SHE RECEIVED IT. THAT SHOULD BE 
12 SUFFICIENT UNDER THE CASE LAW, YOUR HONOR. 
13 AS FAR AS THE ASSAULT CHARGE GOES, IF THE 
14 DEFENSE IS WILLING TO ADMIT THAT THERE IS AN ASSAULT AND PUT 
15 THAT ASSAULT ALONG WITH THE FACT THAT THERE'S A PEACE OFFICER 
16 THERE, THAT QUALIFIES AS ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER. 
17 WHAT HE MADE WAS AN AFFIRMATIVE MOVEMENT. 
18 HE DID NOT JERK HIS HAND AWAY WHEN THE OFFICER ATTEMPTED TO 
19 GET HIM TO HANDCUFF HIM. THAT COULD BE ARGUABLY RESISTING 
20 ARREST. HE DIDN'T DO THAT. HE PLACED HIS HANDS LIKE THIS, AND 
21 AFFIRMATIVELY SHOVED AGAINST THE OFFICER KNOCKING HIM OFF 
22 BALANCE. 
23 THAT IS NOT A RESPONSIVE MOVE, THAT IS AN 
24 AFFIRMATIVE, AGGRESSIVE MOVE, AND THAT IS SUFFICIENT TO 
25 ESTABLISH THE THIRD COUNT OF ASSAULT ON A PEACE OFFICER. 
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1 MR. STEELE: NOTHING FURTHER, YOUR HONOR. 
2 THE COURT: WELL, OF COURSE YOU KNOW MY ROLE 
3 HERE, WITH THE JURY THERE, IS NOT TO RULE WHERE THERE'S A 
4 QUESTION OF FACT, WHICH THE JURY COULD LISTEN TO, AND I THINK 
5 THAT ON COUNT II, THAT THERE-THE STATE HAS BROUGHT FORTH 
6 SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO SUBMIT IT TO THE JURY. 
7 I'M NOT SAYING EITHER WAY HOW THE JURY SHOULD 
8 OR SHOULDN'T RULE, OR HOW I WOULD RULE IF THERE WASN'T A JURY. 
9 I'M SAYING THAT THERE WAS SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE THERE THAT 
10 REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER, AND SO I FEEL OBLIGATED TO 
11 SUBMIT IT TO THE JURY. 
12 THE SAME SITUATION IS TRUE WITH RESPECT TO 
13 COUNT NO. Ill AS FAR AS THE ASSAULT CHARGE IS CONCERNED. THE 
14 OFFICER HAS MADE A STATEMENT THAT HE WAS PUSHED OFF BALANCE, 
15 AND THAT THIS COULD BE ARGUED TO THE JURY, AND AGAIN 
16 REASONABLE MINDS COULD DIFFER, AND I WOULD HAVE TO DENY THE 
17 DEFENSE'S MOTION ON BOTH COUNTS. 
18 COUNSEL, AND MR. SHREWSBURY, I WOULD ASK YOU 
19 TO COME INTO CHAMBERS AND LET'S SEE WHAT WE CAN DO ON THE 
20 INSTRUCTIONS. 
21 MS. BYRNE: I NEED THE BENEFIT OF THE RECORD FOR 
22 TWO MOMENTS, IF I MAY. ONE OF THEM IS THAT ALTHOUGH THE 
23 EXCLUSIONARY RULE WAS NEVER INVOKED BY THE DEFENSE, ALL OF 
24 MY WITNESSES WERE OUTSIDE DURING THE ENTIRETY OF THE OTHER 
25 WITNESSES* TESTIMONY, AND ONLY CAME IN WHEN THEY WERE CALLED 
1 3 © 
1 TO TESTIFY. 
2 THE OTHER MATTER IS THAT THE STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 
3 9, WHICH IS THE REPORT OF THE CRIMINALIST, WHICH HAS BEEN 
4 ADMITTED INTO EVIDENCE, I AM TOLD BY THE CRIMINALIST SHE MUST 
5 HAVE THIS COPY TO TAKE BACK WITH HER TO THE CRIME LAB. 
6 YOUR BAILIFF KINDLY WENT DOWN AND MADE A 
7 COPY, AN EXACT COPY OF WHAT WAS WRITTEN. IF COUNSEL WOULD 
8 LIKE TO LOOK AT IT, WE WOULD LIKE TO SUBSTITUTE THE COPY FOR 
9 STATE'S EXHIBIT NO. 9. 
10 MR. STEELE: THAT'S SUFFICIENT. 
11 MS. BYRNE: OKAY. APPARENTLY THERE'S NO 
12 PROBLEM. I WILL REMOVE THE STICKER FROM THE ORIGINAL--. 
13 THE COURT: WELL, HE CAN PUT A NEW ONE ON IT. 
14 JUST CROSS THROUGH THAT ONE. 
15 MS. BYRNE: AS I SAY, IF IT'S REMOVABLE, THEN FINE. 
16 IT SEEMS TO BE. OKAY. THEN WITH THE COURT'S PERMISSION, I WILL 
17 PLACE THIS INTO EVIDENCE AND RETURN THE ORIGINAL THAT 
18 APPARENTLY HAS TO GO BACK TO THE CRIME LAB TO THE 
19 CRIMINALIST. 
20 THE COURT: WILL THAT DO IT? 
21 MS. BYRNE: THAT DOES IT FOR ME, YOUR HONOR. 
22 THANK YOU. 
23 THE COURT: OKAY. COME INTO CHAMBERS AND LET'S 
24 DO THE INSTRUCTIONS. 
25 (WHEREUPON, AT THE HOUR OF 4:20 P.M., THE 
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